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INTRODUCTION 
The World Health Organization (“WHO”) declared the 2009 
H1N1 swine flu a pandemic on June 11, 2009.1  This is the first 
influenza pandemic of the twenty-first century.2  In response to the 
rapid spread of the global 2009 H1N1 swine flu, which proved 
fatal in some cases, pharmaceutical companies developed an 
effective vaccine against the 2009 H1N1 swine flu (“2009 H1N1 
vaccine”).3  These pharmaceutical companies submitted patent 
 
 1 See Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Statement Recognizing Swine 
Flu Pandemic 1 (June 11, 2009), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/ 
influenzaAH1N1_presstranscript_20090611.pdf. 
 2 See generally Luan-Yin Chang et al., Novel Swine-Origin Influenza Virus A (H1N1): 
The First Pandemic of the 21st Century, 108 J. FORMOS MED. ASSOC. 526 (2009), 
available at http://ajws.elsevier.com/ajws_archive/200971087A6406.pdf; Sami Al Hajjar 
& Kenneth McIntosh, The First Influenza Pandemic of the 21st Century, 30 ANN. SAUDI 
MED. 1 (2010), available at http://www.saudiannals.net/temp/AnnSaudiMed3011-
6952164_191841.pdf. 
 3 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Key Facts About 2009 H1N1 Flu 
Vaccine, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/vaccine_keyfacts.htm (last visited Feb. 
21, 2010) [hereinafter CDC, Key Facts About 2009 H1N1 Flu Vaccine]; U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration, Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccines Composition and 
Lot Release, http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceCompliance 
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applications for their novel 2009 H1N1 vaccine formulation.4  
Patent law incentivizes inventors to develop new ideas by giving 
the patentees economic inducements in exchange for the research, 
development, time, and resources that they invest in producing the 
invention.5  Pharmaceutical companies hope to obtain the 
protections of a patent, which would give them the exclusive right 
to manufacture and distribute this vaccine.6 
However, the 2009 H1N1 vaccine poses several unique issues 
that interfere with the typical structure of patent applications and 
the associated incentives for patent applicants.  For example, while 
pharmaceutical companies want to patent their inventions, obtain 
exclusive rights, and generate profits from their vaccines,7 public 
health goals are furthered by disseminating the vaccine to as many 
individuals as possible in order to achieve widespread disease 
protection by immunizing the public.8  In addition, whereas patent 
protection furthers society’s goals, patenting pharmaceutical 
products and biotechnological inventions in general, and the 2009 
H1N1 vaccine in particular, raises unique moral questions.9 
Due to the expected severity of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu 
pandemic, several public health agencies became actively involved 
in tracking the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus, educating the public 
about this illness, suggesting preventative vaccination against this 
virus, and offering medical treatment options in the event that a 
patient contracts this disease.10  The vaccines produced by 
 
RegulatoryInformation/Post-MarketActivities/LotReleases/ucm181956.htm (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter FDA, Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccines 
Composition and Lot Release]. 
 4 See, e.g., U.S. Patent Application No. 20090047353 (filed Nov. 6, 2006).  
 5 See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 127 (rev. 4th ed. 2007). 
 6 See Kyle Wamstad, Priority Review Vouchers—A Piece of the Incentive Puzzle, 14 
VA. J.L. & TECH. 126, 129 (2009). 
 7 See id. at 131 (“Without the market exclusivity and protections of patented property, 
researchers would not likely invest significant time and resources to develop modern drug 
therapies.”). 
 8 See Joseph Nicosia III, Avian Flu: The Consumer Costs of Preparing for Global 
Pandemic, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 479, 491–92 (2006). 
 9 See infra Part I.A.3. 
 10 See generally Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009 H1N1 Flu, 
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter CDC, 2009 H1N1 
Flu]; World Health Organization, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, http://www.who.int/csr/ 
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pharmaceutical companies will aid public health agencies, such as 
the WHO and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(“CDC”), in implementing their disease management goals.  
Therefore, these public health agencies, as well as the federal 
government, collaborated with the pharmaceutical industry to 
achieve the desired public health goals of reducing 2009 H1N1 
swine flu transmission, improving immunity against this disease, 
and reducing symptoms or severe complications, including death, 
in instances where the illness cannot be prevented.11  Yet while 
public health agencies and government authorities may believe that 
it is imperative to pool their resources with pharmaceutical 
companies’ resources for the benefit of the public’s health, the 
differences between these entities’ immediate goals pose 
challenges.  Specifically, the patentees’ goals of economic rewards 
and the pharmaceutical companies’ goals of profits could conflict 
with public health organizations’ goals of safe and effective 
vaccines and widespread vaccination that will reduce the incidence 
of disease. 
The conflicts existing between patent law and public health 
objectives are particularly apparent and extremely relevant in the 
context of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic.  This Note will 
examine the conflict between the exclusive rights that each 
pharmaceutical company seeks to achieve via its patents for the 
2009 H1N1 vaccine12 and the requirements of public health 
agencies and the federal government whose utmost priority is the 
protection of the public’s health.13  Specifically, this Note will 
address two inter-related conflicts that have arisen.14  The first 
 
disease/swineflu/en/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2009) [hereinafter WHO, Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009]. 
 11 See generally CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu, supra note 10; WHO, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 
supra note 10.  In addition, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) was actively 
involved in approving the 2009 H1N1 vaccine in a timely manner. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.2 
(2010). 
 12 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 13 See MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE 
LAW AND ETHICS 869 (7th ed. 2007). 
 14 A third conflict, which also entails a timing issue, involves the need to create the 
vaccine and produce it in a timely fashion versus the requirements set forth by the FDA, 
an agency that must carefully and diligently examine the risks and benefits of the 
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tension involves the financial gain and the exclusivity right desired 
by the pharmaceutical companies that have applied for patents as 
opposed to the goals of public health authorities who seek to 
immunize as many individuals as possible at no cost to the public.  
The second related tension involves the notion that an influenza 
vaccine, in general, is usually effective for only one flu season.15  
This fact partially offsets the inherent financial benefits accrued 
once a patent is granted to a pharmaceutical company for a patent 
term of twenty years,16 a benefit that appears to be unnecessary 
because the usefulness of the vaccine will have ended after one flu 
season, a time period of less than one year.17 
In its evaluation of the first conflict, this Note examines how 
the United States government intervened in response to the 2009 
H1N1 swine flu pandemic in order to resolve this situation in a 
manner that achieves the desired public health outcome.  After 
purchasing 250 million 2009 H1N1 vaccines from pharmaceutical 
companies, the federal government made these vaccines available 
to the public at no charge.18  This mass purchase of the 2009 H1N1 
vaccine by the government satisfied the financial compensation 
that the pharmaceutical companies sought in return for their 
research, development, and production efforts while concurrently 
achieving the public health goal of widespread 2009 H1N1 vaccine 
distribution.  This Note proposes additional solutions that help 
resolve the aforementioned conflict in the case of the 2009 H1N1 
swine flu pandemic; it also presents solutions that can be applied to 
future pandemics or to public health crises of similar magnitude.  
For example, in order to combat a shortage not only of the 2009 
 
proposed vaccine before it is marketed to the public. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.2.  This conflict 
will not be addressed in this Note.  
 15 See ANTHONY E. FIORE, M.D. ET AL., ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON IMMUNIZATION 
PRACTICES, PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF SEASONAL INFLUENZA WITH VACCINES (2009), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5808a1.htm (indicating 
that “[i]nfluenza viruses undergo frequent antigenic change (i.e., antigenic drift); to gain 
immunity against viruses in circulation, patients must receive an annual vaccination 
against the influenza viruses that are predicted on the basis of viral surveillance data”).  
 16 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).   
 17 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 18 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, H1N1 Flu: What You Should 
Know and Do This Flu Season If You Are 65 Years and Older (Jan. 19, 2009), 
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/65andolder.htm [hereinafter CDC, 65 and Older]. 
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H1N1 vaccine, but also shortages of the seasonal flu vaccine, the 
government could establish additional laboratories specifically for 
the purpose of vaccine production.  These government laboratories 
could prove beneficial in cases of pandemics, such as the 2009 
H1N1 swine flu, when the facilities of the private pharmaceutical 
companies are overtaxed due to urgent demands for maximal 
vaccine production.  The government laboratories could function 
in a manner similar to a licensing agreement.  Various 
compensation arrangements could then be created to financially 
reward the patentee. 
The second conflict addressed in this Note analyzes the 
disparity between the twenty-year length of the patent term19 and 
the clinical efficacy of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine or any other 
influenza vaccines, which are typically limited to only one flu 
season.20  It discusses the possibility of employing short-term 
patents in a manner similar to the rapidly evolving computer 
software technology industry.  This Note also suggests another 
expedited patent approval process that could be effective in 
curtailing the deleterious effects associated with public health 
emergency situations.  Under this approach, patents relating to 
emergency public health crises would be evaluated immediately by 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 
examiners.21  On the other hand, this Note posits that vaccines and 
other biotechnological innovations provide benefits for the public 
good beyond the initial pandemic or primary disease duration due 
to the usefulness of the scientific process and methodology 
introduced by the inventor.  Therefore, granting a twenty-year 
patent would appear logical especially in view of the extensive 
research that is required prior to releasing the vaccine or other 
biotechnological innovation.  The twenty-year patent would 
concomitantly promote inventors and pharmaceutical companies to 
achieve the concurrent goals of combating disease and promoting 
public health while reaping financial rewards for themselves. 
 
 19 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
 20 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 21 The amount of time that a patent examiner typically spends evaluating a patent 
application during prosecution is eighteen hours. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at 
the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2001). 
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Part I of this Note (1) provides an overview of the rights 
granted by a patent, a discussion of the incentives for patenting 
vaccines, and an analysis of the morality of patent law as it relates 
to vaccines; (2) discusses the goals of public health and health law, 
and addresses the unique issues that arise with vaccines; and (3) 
describes the 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic and the 2009 H1N1 
vaccine, as well as the history of previous flu outbreaks, including 
the 1976 H1N1 swine flu outbreak and vaccine.  Part II of this 
Note discusses the conflict that arises between patents and public 
health law within the context of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu 
pandemic.  Recommendations to resolve these conflicts are 
presented, including an evaluation of the policies that the United 
States government has already implemented in order to resolve the 
conflict.  Part III of this Note discusses the conflict between the 
twenty-year patent term and the short duration of public health 
benefits derived from the clinical use of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine.  
This section also proposes suggestions to reconcile this conflict, 
including issuing short-term patents and providing incentives for 
the long-term value derived from developing biotechnological 
innovations. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Patent Law 
Congress regulates patent law.  The United States Constitution 
grants Congress the “[p]ower . . . to promote the [p]rogress of 
[s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to 
[a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective 
[w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”22  Thus, the Constitution authorizes 
Congress to provide inventors with exclusive rights over their 
discoveries in order to encourage scientific innovation and 
progress.23 
 
 22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 23 Wamstad, supra note 6, at 129 (“From its inception Congress has been entrusted to 
nurture innovation through grants of exclusive market power to patent recipients . . . .  
[T]he Founders recognized that invention led to utility and authorized Congress to confer 
an exclusive market right to encourage such invention.”). 
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This section of the Note evaluates the conferral of patent rights 
upon scientists and companies who develop biological products,24 
specifically vaccines, in exchange for these companies’ assistance 
in “promot[ing] the [p]rogress of [s]cience.”25  Part I.A.1 
delineates the requirements for obtaining a patent and describes the 
rights that a patentee receives once a patent is issued.  Part I.A.2 
explains the inherent value and benefit derived by the patentee that 
would motivate the inventor to seek a patent for the newly 
invented vaccine.  Part I.A.3 discusses the morality debate 
associated with patenting vaccines and addresses several 
arguments and counter-arguments. 
1. Patent Eligibility and Rights Granted by a Patent 
The United States codified the Patent Act26 in order to 
implement a national standard of patentability.27  In order to obtain 
a patent in the United States, an inventor must file an application 
with the PTO.28  The PTO engages in a formal evaluation of each 
application, which must be reviewed by professional examiners.29  
These examiners review each invention that is potentially eligible 
for a patent to ensure that the device complies with the Patent Act, 
which sets forth five requirements for patentability: subject matter, 
utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and disclosure.30 
The Patent Act specifies that patents will only cover a limited 
subject matter, which extends to a “process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
 
 24 HUGH B. WELLONS ET AL., BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 605 (2007) (“Biological 
products include a diverse range of substances, such as vaccines, blood and blood 
components, allergenics, gene therapy, cellular and tissue-based products, recombinant 
therapeutic proteins, and xenotransplantation products.”). 
 25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 26 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006). 
 27 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 121.  Prior to the codification of the first patent 
statute in 1790, “[s]tate patents were granted in most of the original thirteen colonies, 
beginning with a Massachusetts patent in 1641.” Id. 
 28 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, How to Get a Patent, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/patents/howtopat.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
 29 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 121. 
 30 See id. at 124. 
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thereof.”31  The second requirement analyzed by the PTO prior to 
granting a patent is utility.32  The third requirement, novelty, 
enumerates a list of conditions wherein a device is not considered 
to be novel and thus not patentable.33  The PTO also scrutinizes the 
invention to ensure that the discovery was not obvious.34  The 
Patent Act determines non-obviousness by comparing the current 
invention with previous developments that have been made in the 
field.35 The final factor evaluated by the PTO is disclosure, which 
 
 31 35 U.S.C. § 101 (delineating the subject matter eligible for patent).  In its 2009 term, 
the U.S. Supreme Court will decide Bilski v. Kappos. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 
(2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9, 
2009).  The Court may reinterpret § 101 and the statutory scope of patentability at that 
time.  The Patent Act also requires the inventor to include “one or more claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention” in the specification. 35 U.S.C. § 112.   
 32 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”).  However, the importance of the utility 
prerequisite to patentability has decreased over time.  Currently, the definition of utility is 
so broad that it even encompasses inventions that have only worked in experimental 
situations, but have not acquired any actual use. MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 124 
(“Only if an invention has absolutely no ‘practical utility’ will a patent be denied.”).  Yet, 
this broad definition may be slightly circumscribed because it is unclear “whether 
laboratory promise is enough to establish utility in treating human patients.” Id.  This 
quote about the patentability of pharmaceuticals, such as vaccines, during their 
experimental stages is relevant to the subject matter of this Note, which is concerned with 
the swine flu.  It is also interesting to note that Baxter International Inc., one of the 
pharmaceutical companies that developed a swine flu vaccine, filed a patent for the 
vaccine on August 28, 2008, approximately one year before the swine flu outbreak that 
began in March 2009. U.S. Patent Application No. 20090060950 (filed Aug. 28, 2008).  
It is likely that in 2008, when Baxter applied for a patent, its vaccine had only been used 
in experimental settings. 
 33 See 35 U.S.C. § 102.  Therefore, if a device meets any of the criteria set forth in 
section 102 of the Patent Act, it will not be eligible for a patent.  For example, these 
conditions include objects that were previously known or used, inventions that were 
previously patented, and creations whose subject matter was not invented by the person 
seeking the patent. Id. § 102(a), (b), (f).  Thus, the novelty requirement employs technical 
rules in order to ensure that the patent applicant was the first to invent the device. 
MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 124. 
 34 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences 
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”). 
 35 Id.  This sub-section underscores that “the differences between the subject matter 
sought to be patented and the prior art” must be scrutinized in order to determine non-
obviousness. Id.  The Patent Act implies that if the differences are not significant enough, 
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is comprised of the written description requirement, enablement, 
and setting out the best mode.36  This prerequisite to obtaining a 
patent obligates the inventor to disclose the process that was 
employed when the potentially patentable device was created.  
This requirement is imposed so that once the patent expires and the 
patentee no longer maintains the right of exclusivity, others would 
be able to make the device as well.37 
A patent is “the grant of a property right to the inventor, issued 
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office.”38  A patent 
holder, or patentee, has 
the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout 
the United States or importing the invention into the 
United States, and, if the invention is a process, of 
the right to exclude others from using, offering for 
sale, or selling through the United States, or 
importing into the United States, products made by 
that process . . . .39 
 
the new creation will not be eligible for a patent.  Hence, this requirement “attempts to 
measure . . . the technical accomplishment reflected in an invention.” MERGES ET AL., 
supra note 5, at 124 (emphasis in original).  
 36 See 35 U.S.C. § 112.  This factor requires the patentee to write a  
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of 
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which 
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set 
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his 
invention. 
Id. 
 37 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 125 (“The disclosure and ‘enablement’ 
requirements . . . ensure that those ‘skilled in the art’ of the invention can read and 
understand the inventor’s contribution, and that after the patent expires they will be able 
to make and use the invention themselves.”). 
 38 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, General Information Concerning Patents, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html (last visited Sept. 25, 
2009).  The PTO “examines applications and grants patents on inventions when 
applications are entitled to them; it publishes and disseminates patent information, 
records assignment of patents, maintains search files of U.S. and foreign patents, and 
maintains a search room for public use in examining issued patents and records.” Id. 
 39 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).  The exclusive right held by the patentee gives “the inventor 
the right to sue not only those who ‘steal’ his invention, but those who reverse engineer it 
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These rights are held by the patentee for a term of twenty 
years, which begins to toll on the date that the patent is filed40 even 
though the patentee cannot exercise these exclusivity rights until 
the date when the patent is granted.41  Although the patentee 
possesses these rights under the Patent Act, which include the right 
to sell the invention,42 creators of biological products,43 such as 
vaccines, are not permitted to sell their inventions in the United 
States until the United States Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) grants its approval.44 
This Note will focus upon vaccines, specifically the 2009 
H1N1 swine flu vaccine, which fall within the realm of scientific 
inventions that are eligible for patents because they comply with 
the five prerequisites of patentability.  Thus, it is presumed that the 
creators of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine could obtain the right to 
exclusively create the vaccine for a twenty-year patent term. 
2. Benefits of and Incentives for Patenting Vaccines 
The purpose of patents is to provide the requisite incentive for 
inventors whose creations will “advance a public good.”45  
However, patent law recognizes that “inventions are public goods 
that are costly to make and that are difficult to control once they 
are released into the world.”46  In order to strike a balance between 
these ends, patent law relies upon economic principles that provide 
tangible financial incentives to promote the creation of novel 
 
and even those who develop the same invention independently.” MERGES ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 127. 
 40 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).  It is also possible for the term of the patent to begin at an 
earlier date if a previous patent application was filed in accordance with other provisions 
of the Patent Act. See id.; see also id. §§ 120, 121, 365(c). 
 41 See id. § 154(a)(2); see also Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express 
Lanes—Proposals for Decreasing Traffic Congestion in the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 119, 127 (2005). 
 42 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). 
 43 See supra note 24. 
 44 See 21 C.F.R. § 601.2 (2010).   “The exclusionary right . . . [provided by the Patent 
Act] does not automatically grant an affirmative right to do anything; patented 
pharmaceuticals, for instance, must still pass regulatory review at the Food and Drug 
Administration to be sold legally.” MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 126.   
 45 Wamstad, supra note 6, at 130. 
 46 MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 127.   
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products.  For example, patent law provides economic incentives 
for inventors and scientists to invest time and energy in creating 
new inventions.47 
Specifically, “patents provide incentives to individuals by 
offering them recognition for their creativity and material reward 
for their marketable inventions.  These incentives encourage 
innovation,”48 which in turn serves the public good by making 
these discoveries available to society.49  It is believed that society 
would not benefit without patents because inventors would 
otherwise lack the necessary “incentive to invest in creating, 
developing, and marketing new products.”50  This phenomenon is 
equally relevant to the pharmaceutical industry,51 which develops 
vaccines.  In order to encourage pharmaceutical companies to 
innovate, patent law provides the necessary economic motivation 
for these inventors “by allowing [them] to appropriate the full 
economic rewards of [their] invention[s].”52  Thus, the 
pharmaceutical companies are likely to invest both time and 
money into scientific research in exchange for the economic 
rewards that are greatly enhanced by the patent exclusivity rights.53 
These economic incentives are especially pronounced with 
regard to patenting influenza vaccines because each vaccine is only 
effective against a certain strain of a disease.54  Although a 
 
 47 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). 
 48 World Intellectual Property Organization, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), 
http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/patents_faq.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) 
[hereinafter WIPO, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)]. 
 49 Eric D. Zard, Patentability of Human Genetic Information: Exploring Ethical 
Dilemmas Within the Patent Office and Biotechnology’s Clash with the Public Good, 6 
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 486, 491 (2009). 
 50 MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 127.   
 51 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 52 MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 127 (describing the “market-driven incentive to 
invest in innovation”). 
 53 Carol A. Schneider, Felicia Cohn & Cynthia Bonner, Patenting Life: A View from 
the Constitution and Beyond, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 385, 388 (2002).  “This is especially 
important in the pharmaceutical field, where bringing a new drug to market can cost 
several hundred million dollars.” Id. 
 54 See generally Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Seasonal Influenza, 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/disease.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter 
CDC, Seasonal Influenza] (“[I]nfluenza viruses are constantly changing so antibod[ies] 
made against one strain will become less effective against new strains.”).  It is also 
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scientist who is researching a vaccine will devote time to this 
research just like any other inventor, the time that a scientific 
researcher devotes to the creation of a flu vaccine will likely only 
be profitable for one flu season,55 which generally translates into 
the winter months of a calendar year.56  Moreover, the costs of 
creating the vaccine include not only research and development, 
but also the costs of production, regulation, and clinical trials.57  
Due to the shortened time frame during which developers of 
influenza vaccines may recoup their large investments, the creators 
of vaccines have an even greater “interest in being rewarded for 
their effort, typically by being able to recoup financial investments 
in research and development and profit from their inventions.”58 
3. Morality Debate Surrounding Vaccine Patents 
Vaccines may be viewed as having components of both 
pharmaceutical and biotechnological innovations.59  On the one 
hand, vaccines act in a manner similar to pharmaceuticals in that 
they directly combat and lessen the impact of diseases.60  On the 
other hand, vaccines are also similar to biotechnological 
innovations because their development involves the manipulation 
of viral genetic material.61 
Both scholars and practitioners have debated the morality of 
granting patents to the creators of pharmaceuticals.  The majority 
 
necessary to note that more than one flu virus can be present in a given year. Id.  
Furthermore, different variants of the flu exist within each type of influenza virus. Id.  
Thus, it becomes apparent that the word “flu” actually accounts for a lot of variability.  
 55 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  Although the timing and length of each 
flu season varies, on average “influenza activity peaks in January or later” in the northern 
hemisphere. CDC, The Flu Season, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/season/flu-season.htm 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2010).  
 56 CDC, The Flu Season, supra note 55.   
 57 See JULIE MILSTEIN & BRENDA CANDRIES, WORLD HEALTH ORG. DEP’T OF VACCINE 
& BIOLOGICS, ECONOMICS OF VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION: CHANGES 
OVER THE PAST 20 YEARS 3 (1998), http://www.who.int/immunization_supply/ 
introduction/economics_vaccineproduction.pdf. 
 58 Zard, supra note 49, at 491. 
 59 See ANTHONY S. FAUCI ET AL., HARRISON’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 760–
61 (14th ed. 1998). 
 60 Id. at 761 (“As products to be given to healthy individuals to prevent disease, 
vaccines not only must be efficacious but also must lack the capacity to cause harm.”). 
 61 See id. at 760. 
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of the arguments against patenting pharmaceuticals typically 
address the exorbitant price associated with a patent and its effects 
upon developing countries that are unable to afford these 
treatments.62  The Doha Declaration, a proclamation issued by the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Ministerial Conference in 
November 2001,63 articulates the argument against patenting 
pharmaceuticals.64  The Doha Declaration underscores that 
patented pharmaceuticals are sold at higher prices thus prohibiting 
segments of the population from purchasing these patented 
pharmaceuticals, which they cannot afford.65  In fact, the Doha 
Declaration “extend[s] exemptions for pharmaceutical patent 
protection for poor third world countries until 2016,”66 thereby 
allowing citizens of developing countries to more readily access 
drugs and other treatments to combat HIV and AIDS.67  In 
response, those who support granting patents for pharmaceuticals 
argue that maintaining the patent requirement would actually 
benefit developing countries because they may be encouraged by 
the economic incentives to develop their own pharmaceuticals.68 
 
 62 See generally Nicosia, supra note 8, at 491–92 (“While wealthier nations would 
have access to limited supplies of vaccines and antiviral drugs, the poorer countries 
would endure much higher fatality rates, due to lack of medical treatments.”); Sean 
McElligott, Addressing Supply Side Barriers to Introduction of New Vaccines to the 
Developing World, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 415, 415 (2009); Michael A. Santoro, Human 
Rights and Human Needs: Diverse Moral Principles Justifying Third World Access to 
Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 923, 939 (2006). 
 63 Santoro, supra note 62, at 929–30.  The Doha Declaration relates specifically to the 
occurrence and treatment of AIDS in third world countries. See id. at 932–33. 
 64 See id. at 932–33. 
 65 See id. at 933. 
 66 See id. at 930. 
 67 See id. at 932–33 (“The principles enunciated [in the Doha Declaration] helped to 
ameliorate a formidable obstacle—that is, high prices due to pharmaceutical patents—
preventing millions suffering from HIV/AIDS in the third world from obtaining access to 
life-saving and life-enhancing drugs.”).  However, despite the benefits that third world 
countries gain from the Doha Declaration, they still have difficulties affording the 
reduced prices of the drugs. Id. at 933.  Even when these countries manage to obtain 
these treatments, they encounter additional obstacles relating to the distribution of the 
pharmaceuticals and a shortage of medical personnel to administer them. Id. 
 68 Santoro, supra note 62, at 928 (“[P]atents are not only good for corporate profits, 
but also the adoption of strong IP laws would help third world countries to develop their 
own high technology industries and products in the same manner that such laws spur 
innovation in developed countries.”). 
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There are, however, research and development costs associated 
with creating a vaccine, specifically a vaccine in response to a 
pandemic.69  These costs are augmented because countries lack a 
supply of the needed vaccine at the inception of the pandemic.70  In 
fact, commercial vaccine production typically does not occur until 
approximately three to six months after the start of the pandemic.71  
Moreover, as implied in the Doha Declaration, “manufacturing 
capacity for influenza vaccines is overwhelmingly concentrated in 
Europe and North America.”72  Therefore, it once again becomes 
unlikely that “developing countries [will] have access to an 
effective vaccine at an affordable price.”73  Furthermore, “current 
production capacity—estimated at around 300 million doses of 
trivalent seasonal vaccine per year—falls far below the demand 
that will arise during a pandemic,”74 which will likely lead to 
morality problems concerning the distribution of a scarce resource 
during a public health emergency.75 
Another argument that has been advanced in support of 
patenting pharmaceutical inventions is “based on the view that 
patents were the inventor’s ‘natural right’ or just reward for 
inventive activity.”76  This argument is further supported by the 
Patent Act, which provides the inventor with the right of 
exclusivity over his creation.77  As is evidenced by the terms 
“‘piracy’ and ‘stealing’”78 to describe copying pharmaceuticals 
 
 69 World Health Organization, Vaccine Research and Development: Current Status 
(Nov. 2005), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/vaccineresearch2005_11_3/ 
en/index.html. 
 70 See id. (“As a pandemic vaccine needs to be a close match to the actual pandemic 
virus, commercial production cannot begin prior to emergence and characterization of the 
pandemic virus.”). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See James Tabery & Charles Mackett, The Ethics of Triage in the Event of an 
Influenza Pandemic, 2 DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 2, 114 (2008). 
 76 Santoro, supra note 62, at 928–29. 
 77 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006); Santoro, supra note 62, at 929 (“Others are 
morally obliged to recognize the rights of inventors by not copying their creative ideas 
without permission.”). 
 78 Santoro, supra note 62, at 929 (“Perhaps the most telling indicia of how successful 
the pharmaceutical companies were in advancing this argument is the highly charged 
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without permission from the company that initially created and 
patented the treatment, these arguments proffered by the 
pharmaceutical companies have been successful.79 
Similar debates also arise regarding the morality of issuing 
patents, particularly in relation to biotechnological innovations.80  
These debates consider whether morality should be a component of 
patent law.81  One argument notes that “the question of morality in 
essence concerns the act of creating the technology and as such is 
problematic within the patent system, since patent law is concerned 
with protection of technology only.”82  Thus, this view implies 
that, although morality and patents are both concerned with the 
creation process, they are discrete disciplines with differing goals 
and as such, morality should not be applied to patent law.83  Those 
on the other side of the debate, however, contend that “opposing a 
patent on moral grounds is tantamount to preventing the activity 
altogether, by a withdrawal of the incentives to perform it, and 
suggest[] that patent law is a component in regulating, albeit 
indirectly, the creation of biotechnology.”84  This argument focuses 
upon the economic incentives that may serve as motivations for 
 
moral language that is now commonly used to describe situations when pharmaceutical 
products are not accorded strong IP protection.”). 
 79 See id. 
 80 See Benjamin D. Enerson, Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions: 
The Risk of Reviving the Moral Utility Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 687 (2004) 
(“If patent law is to remain relevant in this era of unprecedented biotechnological 
advancement, the question arises as to whether patent examiners or courts should be able 
to deny a patent application or invalidate patents they deem immoral.”).  Much of the 
morality debate surrounding patents relates to the disparities between developed countries 
that produce the drugs and developing countries that require them.  “For example, when 
pharmaceutical corporations from wealthy industrialized nations charge exorbitant 
amounts to individuals and public health systems in developing countries for medicine to 
curb or cure otherwise terminal illnesses, such inflexibility . . .  make[s] the development 
of a universal intellectual property morality all but impossible to achieve.” John 
Tehranian, All Rights Reserved? Reassessing Copyright and Patent Enforcement in the 
Digital Age, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 60 (2003).  This morality consideration will not be 
evaluated in this Note, which solely focuses upon the American patent system. 
 81 See OLIVER MILLS, BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS: MORAL RESTRAINT AND 
PATENT LAW 10 (2005). 
 82 Id. 
 83 See id. 
 84 Id. 
C07_KAPLAN_FINAL_05-12-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2010  4:58 PM 
2010] THE 2009 H1N1 SWINE FLU PANDEMIC 1007 
scientific researchers to engage in biotechnological innovations 
that will ultimately benefit society.85 
Despite the various arguments for and against invoking 
morality when evaluating patents, the American legal system does 
not require patent examiners to address the morality of patents.86  
“However, aspects of some recent biotechnology cases could be 
taken to indicate a limited place in the patent system for moral 
norms suggesting that such considerations, albeit residual, continue 
to apply.”87  Therefore, the evaluation of patents in the United 
States does not require an analysis of the morality associated with 
innovation, although morality concerns can be addressed in 
discrete patent cases. 
B. Health Care and Public Health Law 
Public health law88 and the administration of health care to the 
public must work in concert.89  This joint effort is especially 
critical in the event of potentially life-threatening pandemics, such 
as the 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic.90  In this situation, public 
health agencies and health care providers should work with the 
government and with vaccine manufacturers to ensure adequate 
public education, sufficient availability of the vaccine, and 
efficient administration of the vaccine to the public.91  The FDA is 
a key player in this effort because its approval is required before 
the pharmaceutical companies can commence production and 
distribution of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine.92 
 
 85 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 86 See MILLS, supra note 81, at 173; Enerson, supra note 80, at 691–92.   
 87 MILLS, supra note 81, at 50. 
 88 Public health law is an expansive field that is composed of eight discrete disciplines: 
environmental health law; regulation and reporting (surveillance) of disease and injury; 
laws pertaining to vital statistics; disease and injury control; involuntary testing; contract 
tracing; immunization and mandatory treatment; and personal restrictions. 
 89 See generally Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic Influenza: 
Ethics, Law and the Public’s Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 140 (2007). 
 90 See id. (noting that “constructive partnership among government, industry, and the 
community can vastly improve survival and functioning in an impending crisis”). 
 91 See generally CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu, supra note 10; WHO, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 
supra note 10. 
 92 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.2 (2010). 
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Part I.B.1 provides an overview of public health law and 
discusses the initiatives that public health organizations are 
undertaking in order to ensure the health of the general public 
during the 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic.  Part I.B.2 explains the 
significance of vaccines and describes how vaccines are unique 
among other biologics. 
1. Public Health Law 
Several public health agencies are working in concert with 
front-line medical personnel, the government, and pharmaceutical 
companies in order to combat the 2009 H1N1 swine flu 
pandemic.93  For example, public health agencies are actively 
engaged in the surveillance of the spread of the swine flu 
pandemic.94  In addition to tracking the spread of the 2009 H1N1 
swine flu virus, public health agencies, such as the CDC and the 
WHO, educate the public about the virus and encourage the public 
to become immunized by obtaining the 2009 H1N1 vaccine.95  
Pharmaceutical companies are involved in the public health 
program by creating not only vaccines, which serve as preventative 
measures against acquiring the illness,96 but also antiviral 
medications to treat the condition.97  The federal government has 
also devised a method that allows the 2009 H1N1 vaccine to 
 
 93 See Gostin & Berkman, supra note 89, at 140 (“Planning for an influenza pandemic 
is vital to success . . . .  [C]onstructive partnership among government, industry, and the 
community can vastly improve survival and functioning in an impending crisis.”). 
 94 See, e.g., World Health Organization, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009—Update 74, 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_11_13/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010); 
World Health Organization, Timeline: Geographic Spread of Influenza Activity, 
http://gamapserver.who.int/h1n1/geographic-spread/h1n1_geographic-spread.html (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2010).   
 95 See generally CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu, supra note 10; WHO, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 
supra note 10. 
 96 See FDA, Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccines Composition and Lot 
Release, supra note 3. 
 97 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Influenza (Flu) Antiviral Drugs and 
Related Information, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ 
ucm100228.htm#AntiviralMedications (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter FDA, 
Influenza (Flu) Antiviral Drugs and Related Information] (“Antiviral drugs available by 
prescription can also help to reduce the time it takes for symptoms to improve in 
uncomplicated illness caused by [the] influenza virus, and are sometimes used in selected 
situations to reduce the chance of influenza illness if people are exposed to influenza.”). 
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become widely accessible to members of the general public by 
financing individuals’ purchase of the vaccine.98  As part of its 
pandemic preparedness efforts, the government has also been 
stockpiling antiviral drugs, medications that can be administered to 
patients following their exposure to the 2009 H1N1 swine flu.99  
Doctors, nurses, and other health care practitioners are involved in 
the administration of the vaccine and in prescribing the antiviral 
medication.100  These practitioners also “play an essential role in 
influencing the attitudes of patients regarding appropriate 
immunization.”101 
Public health strategies are “designed to reduce the 
transmission of disease and to protect individuals from injury.”102  
The CDC states that “[t]he single best way to protect against the 
flu is to get vaccinated each year.”103  Likewise, regarding the 
2009 H1N1 swine flu virus, the CDC and other public health 
agencies are encouraging inoculation as the primary mode of 
prevention.104  Since the initial supplies of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine 
 
 98 See H1N1 Update on Answers to Physician Questions, NEWS N.Y. (MSSNY), Nov. 
2009, at 12, available at http://www.mssny.org/mssnycfm/mssnyeditor/File/2009/ 
In_the_News/NONY/Nov_09/NONY-2009-11-web.pdf [hereinafter H1N1 Update on 
Answers to Physician Questions].  “The US [sic] government is purchasing all the novel 
H1N1 vaccine in this country and making it available to physicians and other healthcare 
providers free of charge.” Id.  In turn, individuals do not have to pay their health care 
providers for the cost of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine, but they are required to pay the cost 
involved in administering it. Id. 
 99 See FDA, Influenza (Flu) Antiviral Drugs and Related Information, supra note 97.  
Whereas the 2009 H1N1 vaccine is a preventative measure, antiviral medications are a 
combative treatment measure designed to ameliorate symptoms of the disease. Id. 
 100 See generally Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vaccine Information for 
Clinicians and Health Care Professionals, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/ 
professional.htm#6 (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
 101 FAUCI ET AL., supra note 59, at 769.   
 102 HALL ET AL., supra note 13, at 869. 
 103 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Key Facts About Seasonal Flu Vaccine, 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/keyfacts.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
 104 See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009 H1N1 Influenza 
Vaccine, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/public/vaccination_qa_pub.htm (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter CDC, 2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccine] (“The first and 
most important step to prevent the flu is to get vaccinated.”); World Health Organization, 
Vaccines for Pandemic Influenza A(H1N1), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/ 
frequently_asked_questions/vaccine_preparedness/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 21, 
2010) [hereinafter WHO, Vaccines for Pandemic (H1N1)] (“Influenza vaccines are one 
of the most effective ways to protect people from contracting illness during influenza 
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were limited,105 another public health concern developed regarding 
the distribution of a scarce resource.106  In turn, this concern 
triggered a panoply of social, economic, and political 
consequences relating to rationing the vaccine.107 
In addition to providing the 2009 H1N1 vaccine, public health 
agencies are also educating the public about alternative treatment 
modalities.108  The CDC recommends antiviral drugs,109 such as 
Tamiflu and Relenza, as a second line of defense to protect against 
the symptoms of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus (the vaccine is its 
recommended prevention for the flu).110  These two antiviral 
medications can be administered to patients who have already 
contracted the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus or have been recently 
exposed to it.111  These antiviral treatments shorten the length of 
time an individual is sick with the flu, lessen the severity of 
symptoms, and can also prevent serious health complications.112 
2. How Vaccines Differ from Other Pharmaceuticals 
Vaccines are biologics composed of either “attenuated live or 
killed microorganisms or antigenic portions of these agents . . . 
[that] induce immunity and prevent disease.”113  Vaccines have 
 
epidemics and pandemics. . . .  The vaccines will boost immunity against the new 
influenza, and help ensure public health as the pandemic evolves.”). 
 105 See CDC, 2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccine, supra note 104 (“When [a] vaccine to 
protect against 2009 H1N1 first became available, supplies were limited.”). 
 106 See generally Nicosia, supra note 8, at 491–92. 
 107 See Gostin & Berkman, supra note 89, at 137–40. 
 108 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Antiviral Drugs, 2009–2010 Flu 
Season, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/antiviral.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter 
CDC, Antiviral Drugs, 2009–2010 Flu Season]. 
 109 “Antiviral drugs are prescription medicines (pills, liquid or an inhaled powder) that 
fight against the flu in your body.” CDC, 2009 H1N1 and Seasonal Flu: What You 
Should Know About Flu Antiviral Drugs (Oct. 10, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/ 
freeresources/2009-10/pdf/Antiviral_H1N1_factsheet.pdf. 
 110 Id.  Thus, the 2009 H1N1 vaccine is administered in order to prevent individuals 
from contracting the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus whereas antiviral medications are 
prescribed to individuals who were exposed to the 2009 H1N1 swine flu and are 
combating its symptoms. Id. 
 111 See id. 
 112 See id. 
 113 FAUCI ET AL., supra note 59, at 759. 
C07_KAPLAN_FINAL_05-12-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2010  4:58 PM 
2010] THE 2009 H1N1 SWINE FLU PANDEMIC 1011 
significant public health ramifications.114  Specifically, regarding 
contagious diseases that spread from person to person, public 
health authorities strive to maintain acceptable immunity levels 
within the population.  Achieving herd immunity, “a definable 
prevalence of immunity in the population above which it becomes 
difficult for the organism to circulate and reach new 
susceptibles”115 lowers the incidence of new disease.  Overall, 
public health agencies have been successful in educating and 
encouraging the general population to receive vaccines so as to 
limit the occurrence of contagious diseases that are preventable by 
vaccination.116 
Yet, “vaccines must be developed, manufactured, and 
distributed if they are to be used to protect public health.”117  This 
process is composed of four discrete stages, which evaluate both 
the efficacy and safety of the vaccine being produced.118  These 
steps include animal studies to identify the protective antigen, 
analysis of the antigen’s effect on the immune system, assessment 
of the vaccine’s safety in human populations of various ages, and 
an evaluation of the vaccine’s effectiveness in its target 
population.119  In the United States, private pharmaceutical 
companies, rather than governmental organizations, typically 
create and manufacture vaccines.120 
However, the production of flu vaccines is particularly 
complex.121  Since new strains of the flu emerge each season, a 
novel flu vaccine must be produced each year to combat the 
 
 114 See id. at 769.  For example, “[t]he epidemiologically appropriate use of vaccines 
has resulted in the global eradication of smallpox; the elimination of poliomyelitis in the 
Americas; the virtual elimination of congenital rubella syndrome, tetanus, and diphtheria 
in the United States; and a dramatic reduction in pertussis, rubella, measles, and mumps 
in the United States.” Id. at 758. 
 115 Id. at 760.  Public health agencies must continue to monitor the spread of a 
contagious illness even after herd immunity is achieved within a population. See id. at 
769.  Furthermore, future generations must also be vaccinated if the illness continues to 
circulate. See id. 
 116 See id. at 769.   
 117 HALL ET AL., supra note 13, at 894. 
 118 FAUCI ET AL., supra note 59, at 760. 
 119 See id. at 760–61. 
 120 HALL ET AL., supra note 13, at 894. 
 121 See FAUCI ET AL., supra note 59, at 760. 
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seasonal flu.122  Flu vaccine production was unique during 2009 
because rather than producing one seasonal flu vaccine, 
pharmaceutical companies also produced a second vaccine to 
combat the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus.123  In addition to educating 
the public about the vaccine itself, public health agencies also 
informed the public that the 2009 flu season may pose a greater 
public health threat than the one normally encountered in a typical 
flu season.124  The modification was necessary because the 2009 
H1N1 swine flu was likely to lead to more serious health risks in 
pregnant women and in individuals who are twenty-five years of 
age and under when compared to the typical seasonal influenza.125 
C. 2009 H1N1 Swine Flu 
Swine flu is a type of influenza virus that infects humans, 
although the virus itself originates in pigs.126  Swine flu symptoms 
are similar to those of a typical seasonal flu.127  The symptoms of 
the 2009 H1N1 swine flu “include fever, cough, sore throat, runny 
 
 122 See id. (“Influenza virus, characterized biologically by its antigenic drift, 
periodically emerges in a new antigenic version capable of causing a global pandemic for 
which a new vaccine must be rapidly devised, produced, and distributed.”). 
 123 See CDC, 2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccine, supra note 104.  The availability of two 
vaccines, each providing inoculation against a different strain of flu, resulted in the need 
for public health agencies to educate the population about the difference between these 
vaccines. See id.  Moreover, public health agencies notified the general public that in 
order to receive immunity to both forms of the flu circulating during the 2009 flu season, 
they must receive two separate vaccinations. Id. 
 124 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009–10 Influenza (Flu) Season, 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/season/current-season.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) 
[hereinafter CDC, 2009–10 Influenza (Flu) Season].  “There is concern that the 2009 
H1N1 virus may cause the season to be worse than a regular flu season—with a lot more 
people getting sick, being hospitalized and dying than during a regular flu season.” 
Adraenne Bowe, How to Avoid the Swine Flu This Season, ADVOCATE, Oct. 21, 2009, 
http://www.gcadvocate.com/2009/10/how-to-avoid-the-swine-flu-this-season10/. 
 125 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and 
You, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/qa.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter CDC, 
2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and You]. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Novel H1N1 Flu: Background on the 
Situation, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/background.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) 
[hereinafter CDC, Novel H1N1 Flu: Background on the Situation] (“Novel H1N1 
infection has been reported to cause a wide range of flu-like symptoms, including fever, 
cough, sore throat, body aches, headaches, chills and fatigue.  In addition, many people 
also have reported nausea, vomiting and/or diarrhea.”). 
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or stuffy nose, body aches, headache, chills and fatigue.”128  
However, the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus differs from the typical 
seasonal flu virus.129  For example, the 2009 “novel H1N1 virus 
preferentially infects younger people . . . under the age of 25 
years.”130  This particular targeting does not occur with typical flu 
viruses that infect all ages of the population with an increased 
frequency among the elderly.131  Furthermore, it should be noted 
that between one-third and one-half of the fatal 2009 H1N1 swine 
flu episodes have occurred in healthy individuals132 whereas the 
typical seasonal flu primarily results in death among the frail or 
elderly populations.133  The typical flu season in the United States 
spans from late November through March134 whereas swine flu can 
develop on a more erratic time table.135  For example, in 2009, 
swine flu was first detected in the United States in April,136 after 
the conclusion of the typical flu season.137  The CDC states that 
annual vaccination is the best mode of prevention against acquiring 
the seasonal flu.138  Similarly, a vaccine has been created in order 
to prevent the spread of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus.139 
 
 128 CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and You, supra note 125. 
 129 See generally id.; CDC, Seasonal Influenza, supra note 54; CDC, The Flu Season, 
supra note 55. 
 130 Chan, supra note 1, at 2. 
 131 See id. 
 132 See id. (“Around one third to half of the severe and fatal [swine flu] infections are 
occurring in previously healthy young and middle-aged people.”). 
 133 See id. 
 134 See CDC, The Flu Season, supra note 55. 
 135 See CDC, 2009–10 Influenza (Flu) Season, supra note 124. 
 136 See CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and You, supra note 125. 
 137 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2008–2009 Influenza Season Week 
15 Ending April 18, 2009 (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/weekly 
archives2008-2009/weekly15.htm.  During the week of April 12 to 18, 2009, the seasonal 
flu decreased to only a 6.2% occurrence in the United States. Id.  On April 15, 2009, that 
same week, the CDC confirmed the first case of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu strain in the 
United States. CDC, Novel H1N1 Flu: Background on the Situation, supra note 127.  
“[I]n the United States, significant novel H1N1 illness has continued into the summer, 
with localized and in some cases intense outbreaks occurring.” Id.  
 138 CDC, Seasonal Influenza, supra note 54. 
 139 CDC, 2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccine, supra note 104.  “Vaccines are the most 
powerful public health tool for control of influenza, and the U.S. government worked 
closely with manufacturers to take steps in the process to manufacture a 2009 H1N1 
vaccine.” HAW. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, 2009 H1N1 INFLUENZA VACCINE FREQUENTLY 
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This section of the Note analyzes the history of the swine flu in 
the United States as well as the preventative measures that can be 
taken to combat this strain of influenza.  Part I.C.1 summarizes the 
2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic.  Part I.C.2 depicts the previous 
swine flu outbreaks in the United States, which occurred in 1918 
and in 1976.  Part I.C.3 illustrates the series of events associated 
with the 1976 swine flu vaccine.  Finally, Part I.C.4 describes the 
current swine flu vaccine that is intended to combat the 2009 
H1N1 swine flu. 
1. The Current 2009 H1N1 Swine Flu Pandemic 
On June 11, 2009, the WHO declared a global swine flu 
pandemic.140  The WHO’s proclamation concomitantly raised the 
pandemic alert to a Phase 6 level, which reflects the global nature 
of the disease.141  Generally, “[a]n influenza pandemic can be 
defined as a global epidemic of influenza and it occurs when a new 
influenza virus (i.e. an influenza virus subtype that is not 
circulating widely in human beings) emerges and starts spreading 
in a similar way to normal influenza—through coughing and 
sneezing.”142  Since humans have not been previously exposed to 
the specific virus, they do not possess the requisite immunity to 
 
ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQ) 1 (2009), available at http://hawaii.gov/health/about/reports/ 
H1N1_FAQ_forWEB.pdf. 
 140 Chan, supra note 1, at 1.  WHO data reveals that on June 11, 2009, there were 
28,774 reported cases of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu that occurred in 74 countries. World 
Health Organization, Influenza A(H1N1)—Update 47 (June 11, 2009), http://www.who. 
int/csr/don/2009_06_11/en.  Of those cases, 144 resulted in death. Id. 
 141 Chan, supra note 1, at 1.  “Phases 1–3 [of the WHO phases of pandemic alerts] 
correlate with preparedness, including capacity development and response planning 
activities, while Phases 4–6 clearly signal the need for response and mitigation efforts.” 
World Health Organization, Current WHO Phase of Pandemic Alert, http://www.who. 
int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/phase/en/print.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).  Phase 6 
is the pandemic phase, which is defined as “human-to-human spread of the virus into at 
least two countries in one WHO region . . . [and] by community level outbreaks in at least 
one other country in a different WHO region.” Id.  It should be noted that the WHO 
elevated the pandemic alert to Phase 6 in response to the spread of the 2009 H1N1 swine 
flu and not due to the severity of the disease. CDC, Novel H1N1 Flu: Background on the 
Situation, supra note 127. 
 142 World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe, http://www.euro.who.int/ 
influenza/20080618_20 (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter WHO, Regional Office 
for Europe]. 
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fight the novel flu virus that has emerged and thus are affected by 
the symptoms of the disease.143 
This lack of human immunity to pandemic influenzas, like the 
2009 H1N1 swine flu virus, causes those who “contract pandemic 
influenza . . . to experience [a] more serious disease than that 
caused by normal influenza.”144  Moreover, the 2009 H1N1 swine 
flu is not a typical human flu and according to the WHO, the 
current virulent strain of the swine flu that triggered the pandemic 
has never infected humans in the past.145  Furthermore, although 
this strain is referred to as the swine flu, it is actually a “quadruple 
reassortant” virus composed of “two genes from flu viruses that 
normally circulate in pigs in Europe and Asia and bird (avian) 
genes and human genes.”146 
This particular swine flu outbreak, which is caused by the 2009 
H1N1 swine flu strain, originated in Mexico in March 2009, 
toward the end of Mexico’s annual flu season.147  However, 
 
 143 FAUCI ET AL., supra note 59, at 760 (“[A]n individual is susceptible to all serotypes 
against which he or she lacks [an] antibody.”). 
 144 WHO, Regional Office for Europe, supra note 142. 
 145 See Chan, supra note 1, at 1 (“In late April, WHO announced the emergence of a 
novel influenza A virus . . . . The virus is entirely new, the virus is contagious, spreading 
easily from one person to another, and from one country to another.”). 
 146 CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and You, supra note 125 (“This virus was 
originally referred to as ‘swine flu’ because laboratory testing showed that many of the 
genes in this new virus were very similar to influenza that normally occur in pigs (swine) 
in North America.  But further study has shown that this new virus is very different from 
what normally circulates in North American pigs.”). 
 147 Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Flu Outbreak Raises a Set of Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/health/27questions.html [hereinafter 
McNeil, Flu Outbreak Raises a Set of Questions].  A separate spike in cases of the 
seasonal flu toward the end of the annual influenza season generally indicates that “B 
strain flus peak[ed] later in the season.” Id.  However, B strain flus are mild flus and 
would not have created the severe illness observed in Mexico. Id.  Edgar Hernandez, a 
five year old Mexican boy, was the first to be infected with this novel swine flu. Marc 
Lacey, From Edgar, 5, Coughs Heard Round the World, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at 
A1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9501E2DC133CF93AA 
15757C0A96F9C8B63.  Hernandez has since recovered from the illness. Donald G. 
McNeil, Jr., W.H.O. Issues Higher Alert on Swine Flu, with Advice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 
2009, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/health/27questions.html 
[hereinafter McNeil, W.H.O. Issues Higher Alert on Swine Flu, with Advice].  It is 
interesting to note that Edgar Hernandez resides in La Gloria, a Mexican town with a 
large pig farming industry. Id.  However, a spokesperson for the pig farming plant 
claimed that all of its pigs were vaccinated against the flu and none of its workers 
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Mexican authorities did not detect the peak in respiratory disease 
and death until early April 2009.148  At that time, Mexican 
authorities sent samples of the virus to the United States for 
assistance in classifying the new disease149 because only two 
laboratories possessed the reagents necessary to identify this novel 
flu strain.150 
By April 24, 2009, there were seven confirmed cases of 2009 
H1N1 swine flu in the United States151 and nine suspected cases.152  
Three days later, on April 27, 2009, the first swine flu death 
occurred in the United States.153  It should be noted, though, that 
the first death from the 2009 H1N1 swine flu in the United States 
involved a 23-month old boy who resided in Mexico City.154  The 
child was visiting family in Brownsville, Texas, a town located 
near the Mexican border, when he began to experience symptoms 
of the virus.155  Thus, it is possible that this child contracted the 
2009 H1N1 swine flu while he was in Mexico rather than in the 
United States.  The toddler spent two weeks at Texas Children’s 
Hospital in Houston before dying from this disease.156 
 
contracted swine flu before Hernandez had gotten sick with the 2009 H1N1 swine flu 
virus. Id. 
 148 McNeil, Flu Outbreak Raises a Set of Questions, supra note 147. 
 149 Id. (“[The Mexicans] ask[ed] for help genotyping the new virus.”). 
 150 Id.  These laboratories are the CDC laboratory located in Atlanta and the Canadian 
National Laboratory in Winnipeg, Canada. Id.  The CDC developed a test kit for 
identifying the 2009 H1N1 swine flu, which it sent to other states and countries to enable 
them to diagnose swine flu. McNeil, W.H.O. Issues Higher Alert on Swine Flu, with 
Advice, supra note 147.  It is possible that this increase in testing for the 2009 H1N1 
swine flu in various locations worldwide “could lead to a sharp increase in confirmed 
cases.” Id. 
 151 World Health Organization, Influenza-like Illness in the United States and Mexico 
(Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_04_24/en.  Of the first seven 
confirmed cases of 2009 H1N1 swine flu in the United States, five occurred in California 
and two arose in Texas. Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 See James C. McKinley, Jr., Mexican Child Visiting U.S. 1st to Die Here of Swine 
Flu, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2009, at A14, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ 
fullpage.html?res=9805E4DF1731F933A05757C0A96F9C8B63. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
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Following the emergence of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu in 
Mexico, the next major outbreak occurred in New York City.157  
The initial cases of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu in New York were all 
connected to Saint Francis Preparatory School in Fresh Meadows, 
Queens.158  Both hospital and city officials in New York noted the 
overwhelming influx of emergency room visits during the spring 
of 2009.159  “On May 25, the worst day of the spring outbreak, 
2,500 people visited emergency rooms in the city complaining of 
influenza-like illness . . . .  The number on the same day last year 
was 150.”160  New York hospital and city officials also identified a 
direct correlation between the daily number of hospital visits and 
the news about 2009 H1N1 swine flu deaths and school 
closings.161  Despite the dramatic increase in the numbers of 
people seeking emergency room care, however, only forty to fifty 
 
 157 Anemona Hartocollis, Lesson Learned, City Prepares for a Resurgence of Swine 
Flu, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/07/21/nyregion/21flu.html [hereinafter Hartocollis, Lesson Learned, City Prepares 
for a Resurgence of Swine Flu].   
As of July 7, 909 New Yorkers had been hospitalized with swine flu 
and 47 had died, a fraction of the 1,000 deaths in New York 
attributed to influenza each year.  City officials estimate that 7 
percent to 10 percent of New Yorkers, or 580,000 to 830,000 people, 
had contracted the H1N1 virus, but most had only mild symptoms.  A 
seasonal flu is usually contracted by 5 percent to 20 percent of the 
population.  
Id.  According to Dr. Thomas A. Farley, the City Health Commissioner, 930 people were 
hospitalized with the 2009 H1N1 swine flu and 54 people died of the swine flu in New 
York. Sewell Chan & Lisa W. Foderaro, This Time, City Says It’s Ready for Swine Flu, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2009, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A04EEDD 
143DF931A3575AC0A96F9C8B63.  A survey conducted by the city’s health department 
indicates that between 750,000 and 1 million New Yorkers suffered from the swine flu in 
the spring of 2009. Id. 
 158 Donald G. McNeil, Jr., U.S. Declares Public Health Emergency over Swine Flu, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2009, http://travel.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/world/27flu.html. 
 159 See Hartocollis, Lesson Learned, City Prepares for a Resurgence of Swine Flu, 
supra note 157. 
 160 Id. 
 161 See id. (“Visits to emergency rooms began to rise sharply on May 16, the day after 
the first news reports that an assistant principal in Queens had been hospitalized with 
swine flu.  The assistant principal, Mitchell Wiener, died on May 17, and another spike in 
hospital visits followed.”).  
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people were actually hospitalized during the worst points of the 
outbreak in May 2009.162 
Although the 2009 H1N1 swine flu spread rapidly, the 
Director-General of the WHO stated that “the overwhelming 
majority of patients experience mild symptoms and make a rapid 
and full recovery—often in the absence of any form of medical 
treatment.”163  Initially, health officials claimed that the majority of 
the people who developed severe reactions to the 2009 H1N1 
swine flu also suffered from other pre-existing conditions.164  
However, new studies have revealed that among 1,400 hospitalized 
adults, 46% did not suffer from any pre-existing or chronic 
conditions.165 
Moreover, health officials remain concerned because 
“[p]andemic flus—like the 1918 flu and outbreaks in 1957 and 
1968—often strike young, healthy people the hardest.”166  This 
phenomenon occurs because the immune response itself in these 
healthy adults is so intense that rather than solely combating the 
virus, the violent immune system response also leads to severe 
pathological ramifications, including death.167  Experts believe that 
older people may have acquired some immunity to the 2009 H1N1 
 
 162 See id. (“[I]n an indication of the large number of what doctors call the ‘worried 
well,’ only 40 to 50 people a day were hospitalized during the worst stretch of that 
month, records show.”).   
 163 Chan, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 164 See Mike Stobbe, Near Half of Swine Flu Patients Otherwise Healthy, ABC NEWS, 
Oct. 13, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory?id=8818376.  In a study of 272 
patients who were hospitalized with the 2009 H1N1 swine flu for at least a 24 hour 
period, 83% of the adults and 60% of the children evaluated also suffered from pre-
existing conditions. Seema Jain, M.D. et al., Hospitalized Patients with 2009 H1N1 
Influenza in the United States, April-June 2009, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1935, 1935, 1937 
(2009), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/NEJMoa0906695.  Asthma 
was the most common pre-existing condition observed among these 272 patients. Id. at 
1937. 
 165 See Stobbe, supra note 164.   
 166 McNeil, Flu Outbreak Raises a Set of Questions, supra note 147.  “Unlike typical 
flu seasons, when infants and the aged are usually the most vulnerable, none of the initial 
deaths in Mexico were in people older than 60 or younger than 3 years old, a 
spokeswoman with the World Health Organization said.” Id. 
 167 See id. (“When a new virus emerges, deaths may occur in healthy adults who mount 
the strongest immune reactions.  Their own defenses—inflammation and leaking fluid in 
lung cells—can essentially drown them from inside.”). 
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swine flu due to their exposure to other similar viruses during their 
lifetime.168 
President Obama and his administration warned Americans 
that “‘[t]he potential for a significant outbreak [of the 2009 H1N1 
swine flu] in the fall is looming.’”169  During the spring, summer, 
and early fall of 2009, biologics and pharmaceuticals were created 
in order to combat this influenza virus.170  The 2009 H1N1 vaccine 
is considered the most effective way to avoid contracting the 2009 
H1N1 swine flu.171  However, antiviral medications, such as 
Tamiflu or Relenza, are also available to both out-patients and to 
those hospitalized with either confirmed or suspected cases of 
swine flu.172  These antiviral drugs reduce both the severity and the 
duration of the illness in patients afflicted with swine flu.173 
 
 168 See Stobbe, supra note 164. 
 169 Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Obama Warns of Return of Swine Flu in the Fall, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 10, 2009, at A18,  available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html? 
res=9D07E3DF103CF933A25754C0A96F9C8B63 [hereinafter McNeil, Obama Warns 
of Return of Swine Flu in the Fall] (“The Obama administration warned Americans . . . to 
be ready for an aggressive return of the swine flu virus in the fall.”).  However, an 
alternative theory, which set forth three arguments, postulated that the 2009 H1N1 swine 
flu is not likely to be “abnormally lethal” during the fall of 2009. Editorial, Preparing for 
the Swine Flu, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01/ 
opinion/01tue1.html?_r=1 [hereinafter Editorial, Preparing for the Swine Flu].  This 
theory began by noting the “encouragingly low death rate” in the spring of 2009, wherein 
only 54 people died of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu among approximately 800,000 New 
Yorkers who contracted the virus. Id.  The theory’s second principle stated that “the virus 
has not become more virulent as it wends its way around the world,” which implied that 
the fall 2009 outbreak should not be more severe than the outbreak that occurred this past 
spring. Id.  Finally, this theory underscored that the “Bush administration and Congress 
invested heavily in planning and in stockpiling medicines and medical supplies to fight a 
feared avian flu pandemic that never materialized, and the Obama administration has 
continued the effort.  The same medicines should work against the swine flu virus.” Id. 
 170 See generally CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and You, supra note 125. 
 171 See CDC, 2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccine, supra note 104.  Part I.C.4 of this Note 
will discuss the current 2009 H1N1 swine flu vaccine. 
 172 See CDC, Antiviral Drugs, 2009–2010 Flu Season, supra note 108 (recommending 
that physicians “prioritize use of these drugs for those patients who are severely ill (such 
as those who are hospitalized) and those patients who are ill with influenza-like illness 
and who are higher risk for influenza related complications”). 
 173 See id. (“[T]hese drugs can reduce the severity of flu symptoms and shorten the time 
you are sick by 1 or 2 days.”).  Three cases of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu were detected 
where the virus was resistant to Tamiflu. McNeil, Obama Warns of Return of Swine Flu 
in the Fall, supra note 169.  “Health officials said that they were aware of fears that a 
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2. Previous Swine Flu Outbreaks in the United States—1918 
and 1976 
A previous swine flu pandemic swept the world in 1918.174  
The 1918 influenza, also known as the Spanish flu,175 infected 
approximately one-third of the world’s population (estimated to be 
roughly 500 million people in 1918)176 and killed between 50 and 
100 million people.177  The morbidity and mortality phenomenon 
observed during the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus outbreak reflects 
that of the Spanish flu, where the “absolute risk of influenza death 
was higher in those [younger than] 65 years of age than in those 
[older than] 65.”178  Therefore, it becomes apparent that the impact 
of the Spanish flu virus extended beyond 1918 because future 
swine flu outbreaks exhibited the same morbidity and mortality 
pattern.  It should also be noted that “[a]ll influenza A pandemics 
since that time . . . have been caused by descendants of the 1918 
 
Tamiflu-resistant strain of the virus was already spreading silently in the United States, 
but that they had not seen evidence that it was a threat.” Id. 
 174 See generally Jeffery K. Taubenberger & David M. Morens, 1918 Influenza: The 
Mother of All Pandemics, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 15 (2006), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol12no01/pdfs/05-0979.pdf (citing a brief history of the 
1918 Spanish flu pandemic in order to illustrate the potential severity of the 2009 H1N1 
swine flu virus).  There were two additional influenza pandemics in the twentieth 
century. Robert B. Belshe, M.D., The Origins of Pandemic Inflenza—Lessons from the 
1918 Virus, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2209, 2209 (2005), available at 
http://content.nejm.org/cgi/reprint/353/21/2209.pdf.  Asian influenza occurred in 1957 
with the H2N2 virus, and the Hong Kong influenza occurred in 1968 with the H3N2 
virus. Id.  These two influenza pandemics were not caused by the H1N1 virus and will 
not be discussed in this Note. 
 175 Nicholas Bakalar, How (and How Not) to Battle Flu: A Tale of 23 Cities, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at F5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/17/health/ 
17flu.html?scp=2&sq=%22spanish%20flu%22&st=cse.  
 176 Taubenberger & Morens, supra note 174, at 15. 
 177 Id. (“Total deaths were estimated at 50 million and were arguably as high as 100 
million.”). 
 178 See id. at 15, 19.  Furthermore, “[n]early half of the [1918] influenza-related deaths . 
. . were in young adults 20–40 years of age.” Id. at 19.  Similarly, the WHO noted that 
“[m]ost cases of severe and fatal infections have been in adults between the ages of 30 
and 50 years.” Chan, supra note 1, at 2.  To this end, the CDC established a priority list 
of individuals who should receive the 2009 H1N1 vaccine, which prioritizes individuals 
between the ages of 25 and 64 years old. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2009 H1N1 Vaccination Recommendation, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/ 
acip.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
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virus,” except for those caused by avian viruses.179  The 2009 
H1N1 swine flu virus has been found to be a descendent of the 
Spanish flu virus, and is composed of “key genes from the 1918 
virus.”180  Like the Spanish flu, the 2009 H1N1 swine flu is caused 
by the H1N1 A strain, which may explain the similar morbidity 
and mortality patterns observed during both pandemics.181 
Another swine flu outbreak, which began in January 1976, was 
detected on an army base in Fort Dix, New Jersey.182  By the end 
of January 1976, 155 cases of swine flu were reported at the Fort 
Dix base.183  No cases of the 1976 swine flu were reported 
anywhere else in the United States.184 
Following the death of an army private, initial concern arose 
because a young, healthy individual is not typically expected to die 
from the flu.185  Subsequently, the CDC tested blood samples from 
the deceased and determined that he in fact had contracted swine 
flu.186  Specifically, the CDC found that the army private’s 
“immune system had developed antibodies to a strain of flu similar 
to the Spanish influenza of 1918.  That particular strain of swine 
flu produced the worst human pandemic of the 20th century.”187  
This discovery caused CDC scientists and researchers to worry that 
 
 179 Taubenberger & Morens, supra note 174, at 15.  The H5N1 and H7N7 viruses are 
the two main examples of avian viruses that caused human infections.  These viruses are 
not descendants of the 1918 virus. Id.  
 180 Id. 
 181 Id.  The 2009 H1N1 swine flu is caused by the (A)H1N1 strain. Id.  Therefore, there 
is further reason to suspect that the 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic could be as virulent 
as the 1918 flu pandemic. 
 182 David J. Sencer & J. Donald Millar, Reflections on the 1976 Swine Flu Vaccination 
Program, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 29, 29 (2006), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol12no01/pdfs/05-0979.pdf.  This Note will analyze the 
vaccine that was developed in order to combat the 1976 H1N1 swine flu. See infra Part 
I.C.3. 
 183 Patrick Di Justo, The Last Great Swine Flu Epidemic, SALON, Apr. 28, 2009, 
http://www.salon.com/env/feature/2009/04/28/1976_swine_flu (“By the end of January, 
155 soldiers at Fort Dix reported positive for swine flu antibodies.  None of the soldiers’ 
families or co-workers, however, had been exposed to the virus; all of the reported swine 
flu cases had been limited to the soldiers in . . . [the] camp.”). 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
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another pandemic could result.188  Government officials shared 
these concerns: “When studies showed a viral infection similar to 
the one responsible for the 1918–1919 Swine Flu pandemic, 
President Ford (and others) urged the appropriation of emergency 
funds for a nationwide influenza immunization program.”189 
3. The 1976 Swine Flu Vaccine 
Fear that the 1976 swine flu would imitate the 1918 Spanish flu 
by infecting and killing a significant proportion of the world’s 
population prompted the United States to develop a swine flu 
vaccine.190  However, it is necessary to underscore that “even with 
modern antiviral and antibacterial drugs, vaccines, and prevention 
knowledge, the return of a pandemic virus equivalent in 
pathogenicity to the virus of 1918 would likely kill [more than] 
100 million people worldwide.”191 
On March 13, 1976, the director of the CDC, concerned about 
a swine flu pandemic, “asked Congress for money to develop and 
test enough swine flu vaccine to immunize at least 80 percent of 
the population of the United States, believed to be the minimum 
needed to avoid an epidemic.”192  Although the director of the 
CDC set forth four possible proposals regarding actions in 
response to the swine flu, the CDC recommended that the federal 
government contract directly with pharmaceutical companies so 
that an adequate amount of vaccine could be produced to 
immunize the population.193  The CDC also suggested that the 
 
 188 Id. (“If [the soldiers at the Fort Dix base] had been exposed to something like the 
1918 flu virus, the world could be in for an extensive and lethal outbreak.”). 
 189 Nina S. Appel, Liability in Mass Immunization Programs, 1980 BYU L. REV. 69, 
69. 
 190 Id. (“When studies showed a viral infection similar to the one responsible for the 
1918–1919 Swine Flu pandemic, President Ford (and others) urged the appropriation of 
emergency funds for a nationwide influenza immunization program.”). 
 191 Taubenberger & Morens, supra note 174, at 21. 
 192 Di Justo, supra note 183. 
 193 See Sencer & Millar, supra note 182, at 30.  The first proposal offered by the 
director of the CDC was to allow the market to operate as usual on the assumption that a 
swine flu pandemic might not result in 1976. Id.  The director’s second suggestion, which 
was ultimately selected, recommended that the federal government “embark on a major 
program to immunize a highly susceptible population” by contracting with 
pharmaceutical companies that would develop and produce the requisite amount of swine 
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“federal government . . . make grants to state health departments to 
organize and conduct immunization programs . . . [and] provide 
vaccines to state health departments and private medical 
practices.”194  President Ford accepted this proposal that involved 
both a federal and state government response.195  Thus, the 
National Influenza Immunization Program was created.196 
During production of the 1976 swine flu vaccine, the 
pharmaceutical companies posed an ultimatum wherein they 
required that “the federal government indemnify them against 
claims of adverse reactions as a requirement for release of the 
vaccine.”197  The government acquiesced and developed the Swine 
Flu Act,198 which assured the manufacturers of the 1976 swine flu 
 
flu vaccines. Id.  The third proposal was a “minimal response, in which the federal 
government would contract for sufficient vaccine to provide to traditional healthcare 
beneficiaries—military personnel, Native Americans, and Medicare-eligible persons.” Id.  
The final alternative suggested an exclusively federal response without involving the 
state governments. Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id.  The CDC created a new unit to implement the National Influenza Immunization 
Program. Id.  This unit:  
was responsible for relations with state and local health departments 
(including administration of the grant program for state operations, 
technical advice to the procurement staff for vaccine, and 
warehousing and distribution of the vaccine to state health 
departments) and established a proactive system of surveillance for 
possible adverse effects of the influenza vaccine. 
Id. at 30–31. 
 197 Id. at 31.  It should be noted that:  
the legislation completely absolved program participants from any 
claims of strict liability under Section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts but not as to claims based on common law 
negligence.  This provision tended to alleviate the most serious 
liability concern of the vaccine manufacturers and required that they 
obtain insurance covering their liability arising from negligence.  
David W. Case, The EPA’s HPV Challenge Program: A Tort Liability Trap?, 62 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 147, 200 (2005). 
 198 See generally National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
380, 90 Stat. 1113.  This statute is  
[a]n Act to amend the Public Health Service Act to authorize the 
establishment and implementation of an emergency national swine 
flu immunization program and to provide an exclusive remedy for 
personal injury or death arising out of the manufacture, distribution, 
or administration of the swine flu vaccine under such program. 
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vaccine that “lawsuits against the government [were] the exclusive 
remedy for all actions connected with the Swine Flu program.”199  
One commentator notes: “While the manufacturers’ ultimatum 
reflected the trend of increased litigiousness in American society, 
its unintended, unmistakable subliminal message blared ‘There’s 
something wrong with this vaccine.’”200 
The Swine Flu Act also contained a provision requiring “the 
development . . . and implementation of a written informed consent 
form and procedures for assuring that the risks and benefits from 
the swine flu are fully explained to each individual to whom such a 
vaccine is to be administered.”201  Of note, the consent form did 
not disclose a warning about the possibility of contracting 
Guillain-Barré syndrome, a severely debilitating neurological 
disorder.202 
The swine flu vaccine became available to the public on 
October 1, 1976.203  By October 11, 1976, only ten days after the 
immunization program commenced, approximately forty million 
people received the swine flu vaccine.204  That evening, three 
elderly Americans died shortly after receiving the swine flu 
vaccine at the same clinic in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.205  Several 
weeks later, “reports appeared of Guillain-Barré syndrome, a 
paralyzing neuromuscular disorder, among some people who had 
 
 Id. 
 199 Appel, supra note 189, at 70. 
 200 Sencer & Millar, supra note 182, at 31.  The indemnification caused “public 
misperception, warranted or not, [which] ensured that every coincidental health event that 
occurred in the wake of the swine flu shot would be scrutinized and attributed to the 
vaccine.” Id. 
 201 National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 
1113.  Subsequent lawsuits held that the vaccine manufacturer “had a duty to warn [the 
vaccine consumer] . . . and that the warning was inadequate to discharge its duty.  
Administered without an adequate warning, the swine flu vaccine was defective, hence 
unreasonably dangerous.” Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1441 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 202 Appel, supra note 189, at 71.  Guillain-Barré syndrome, “an acute demyelinating 
polyneuropathy,” is manifested by a motor paralysis that may also be associated with 
sensory loss. FAUCI ET AL., supra note 59, at 2462.  In severe cases, patients are unable to 
breathe on their own. Id.  The mortality rate associated with Guillain-Barré syndrome is 
3–4%. Id.  More than 85% of patients make a complete recovery. Id. 
 203 Di Justo, supra note 183. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
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received swine flu immunizations.”206  This incidence of Guillain-
Barré syndrome required epidemiologists to analyze whether there 
was a causal connection between the appearance of the 
neurological condition and the 1976 swine flu vaccine.207  The 
overall consensus among epidemiologists was that the number of 
cases of Guillain-Barré syndrome among swine flu vaccine 
recipients was in excess of what could be attributed to chance 
alone.208  Once a causal connection linked the 1976 swine flu 
vaccine to Guillain-Barré syndrome, the National Influenza 
Immunization Program was stopped in December 1976.209  
Ironically, the 1976–1977 “flu season was the most flu-free since 
records had been kept . . . .  The Great Swine Flu Epidemic of 
1976 never took place.”210 
 
 206 Id.  Forty-five deaths are claimed to have occurred as a result of Guillain-Barré 
syndrome. Appel, supra note 189, at 72. 
 207 Sencer & Millar, supra note 182, at 31.   
Because [Guillain-Barré syndrome] cases are always present in the 
population, the necessary public health questions concerning the 
cases among vaccine recipients were “Is the number of cases of 
[Guillain-Barré syndrome] among vaccine recipients higher than 
would be expected?  And if so, are the increased cases the result of 
increased surveillance or a true increase?”  
Id. 
 208 See id. 
 209 Appel, supra note 189, at 72.   
Had H1N1 influenza been transmitted at that time, the small apparent 
risk of [Guillain-Barré syndrome] from immunization would have 
been eclipsed by the obvious immediate benefit of vaccine-induced 
protection against swine flu.  However, in December 1976, with 
[more than] 40 million persons immunized and no evidence of H1N1 
transmission, federal health officials decided that the possibility of an 
association of [Guillain-Barré syndrome] with the vaccine, however 
small, necessitated stopping immunization . . . . 
Sencer & Millar, supra note 182, at 31. 
 210 Di Justo, supra note 183.  By December 1979, a total of 912 lawsuits were filed in 
the United States as a result of the National Influenza Immunization Program. Appel, 
supra note 189, at 72.  “Four hundred and ninety-four of the claimants allege Guillain-
Barr[é] syndrome, 121 allege other neurological disorders, and 252 claim 
nonneurological disorders.” Id. 
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4. The 2009 H1N1 Vaccine 
The 2009 H1N1 vaccine was created to combat the 2009 H1N1 
swine flu virus.211  This vaccine does not provide immunity against 
the seasonal flu virus.212  The FDA granted approval to five 
separate pharmaceutical companies—Novartis Vaccines and 
Diagnostics Ltd., MedImmune LLC, CSL Ltd., Sanofi Pasteur, 
Inc., and ID Biomedical Corporation of Quebec—to market their 
version of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine in the United States.213  The 
vaccine is available in two forms, an injection that consists of the 
inactive virus and a nasal spray that is composed of the live virus 
in a weakened state.214 
The government purchased 250 million doses of the 2009 
H1N1 vaccine.215  The government provided a supply of these 
vaccines to health care providers for administration to the 
public.216  In exchange for receiving the vaccines at no cost, these 
health care providers were permitted to charge patients only for the 
cost of administering the vaccine and not for the vaccine itself.217 
The 2009 H1N1 vaccine was first released on October 5, 
2009.218  Approximately one month after its release, the United 
States began experiencing a swine flu vaccine shortage.219  The 
 
 211 CDC, Key Facts About 2009 H1N1 Flu Vaccine, supra note 3.  “About two weeks 
after vaccination, antibodies that provide protection against 2009 H1N1 influenza virus 
infection will develop in the body.” Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent, 
http://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/vaccines/approvedproducts/ucm181950.htm 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2010). 
 214 CDC, Key Facts About 2009 H1N1 Flu Vaccine, supra note 3. 
 215 See CDC, 65 and Older, supra note 18. 
 216 See H1N1 Update on Answers to Physician Questions, supra note 98, at 12.   
 217 See id. at 12–13; Flu.gov, Vaccine Cost, http://www.flu.gov/individualfamily/ 
vaccination/vcost.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
 218 Anemona Hartocollis, Vaccine Here, Swine Flu Fear Creates a Rush, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 6, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/06/nyregion/06 
vaccine.html?scp=12&sq=swine%20flu%20vaccine&st=cse. 
 219 Donald J. McNeil, Jr., Nation Is Facing Vaccine Shortage for Seasonal Flu, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, at A1, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/health/05 
flu.html?scp=2&sq=vaccine&st=cse [hereinafter McNeil, Nation Is Facing Vaccine 
Shortage for Seasonal Flu].  Anthony S. Fauci, the Director of the National Institute for 
Allergy and Infectious Diseases, explained this shortage based upon “the inexorable 
connection between preparedness for pandemic flu and preparedness for seasonal flu.” Id. 
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shortage is expected to increase as the flu season progresses.220  
However, major health complications, including Guillain-Barré 
syndrome which was a devastating side effect of the 1976 H1N1 
vaccine, have not been reported thus far in association with the 
2009 H1N1 vaccine.221 
II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN PATENT LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
GOALS 
This section discusses the inherent conflict between the 
incentives included in patent rights and the primary goals of public 
health.  Part A addresses the conflict between the exclusive rights 
granted by patents and the public health concerns relating to 
widespread disease prevention.  Part B describes the response of 
the United States government to the 2009 H1N1 swine flu 
pandemic, critiques this response, and proposes alternative 
solutions. 
A. Patents’ Exclusivity Versus Public Health Disease Prevention 
The goals and underlying purpose of patent law often conflict 
with the basic tenets of public health law.  The primary purpose of 
patent law is to provide the patent holder with the right of market 
exclusivity for the patent term.222  Thus, if a 2009 H1N1 vaccine 
manufacturer is granted a patent, this pharmaceutical company 
would simultaneously gain market exclusivity over the novel 
 
(internal quotations omitted).  Thus, the total flu vaccine production, which included both 
swine flu and seasonal flu, was predicted to be inadequate because of the “raised demand 
[which is] beyond what manufacturers can make in a year.” Id. 
 220 See id. 
 221 See Lauran Neergaard, New Group Helps US Monitor Swine Flu Shot Safety, ABC 
NEWS, Nov. 2, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory?id=8971742 (“Initial 
reports to a . . . government database—where anyone can report any symptom,  and 
serious ones get intense investigation—showed nothing unusual after the first 10 million 
vaccinations . . . .  Most reports were of sore arms and fever, plus some flu symptoms that 
suggested people already were infected when they got the shot, too late for it to help.”); 
see also Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, General Questions and Answers on 
2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccine Safety, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/ 
vaccine_safety_qa.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
 222 See Wamstad, supra note 6, at 130. 
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vaccine for the duration of the patent, twenty years from the date 
the patent application was filed.223 
One of the primary concerns of public health agencies involves 
disease prevention.224  Therefore, “countermeasures to impede 
transmission”225 of contagious diseases are a high priority within 
the realm of public health.  Thus, public health interventions 
include preventative measures, such as vaccination.226  Indeed, 
public health agencies, such as the CDC and WHO, recommend 
that people obtain the 2009 H1N1 vaccine, which serves as 
inoculation against the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus.227  In addition 
to recommending that people obtain the vaccine, these public 
health agencies also provide other less invasive recommendations 
to combat the current swine flu pandemic.228  These additional 
recommendations that are offered to the general public in order to 
minimize exposure to the 2009 H1N1 swine flu include washing 
one’s hands with soap and water, covering one’s nose and mouth 
when coughing or sneezing, and avoiding direct contact with one’s 
eyes, nose, and mouth.229 
At first glance, it may appear that patent law and public health 
goals are compatible.  In fact, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft,230 which concerns copyright law, can be 
extrapolated to “indicate that a patent’s purpose always has been 
and continues to be to advance a public good through the conferral 
of a limited private economic privilege.”231  This promise of 
 
 223 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
 224 See Gostin & Berkman, supra note 89, at 137. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, H1N1 Flu Vaccine—Why the Delay?, 
http://www.cdc.gov/Features/H1N1VaccineDelay/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) (“A flu 
vaccine is the single best way to protect against influenza illness. . . .  [A] 2009 H1N1 
vaccine . . .  protect[s] against the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus (sometimes called ‘swine 
flu’).”); WHO, Vaccines for Pandemic (H1N1), supra note 104 (“Influenza vaccines are 
one of the most effective ways to protect people from contracting illness during influenza 
epidemics and pandemics. . . .  The vaccines will boost immunity against the new 
influenza, and help ensure public health as the pandemic evolves.”).   
 228 See CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu, supra note 10. 
 229 See id. 
 230 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 231 Wamstad, supra note 6, at 130. 
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exclusivity inherent in the patent motivates scientists to invent, 
which in turn results in novel technology that is able to “advance a 
public good”232 by allowing society to benefit from this new 
creation.233  Likewise, public health agencies attempt to advance 
the public good by providing health interventions and other 
preventative measures that will curtail the spread and negative 
impact of disease.234  Thus, it seems that both patent law and 
public health policies seek to advance the public good. 
However, an inherent conflict exists between the incentives 
included in patent rights, such as providing the inventor with 
financial rewards by guaranteeing an exclusive patent,235 and the 
public health goal of making the vaccine widely accessible to the 
general population.236  Specifically, segments of the population 
may be unable to afford the cost of patented vaccines.237  Thus, a 
subset of the population may be less likely to receive inoculation 
and thereby would become more susceptible to the 2009 H1N1 
swine flu illness, for example.238  In light of this public health 
issue, questions arise regarding whether the 2009 H1N1 vaccine 
should be patented and furthermore whether it is moral to allow the 
creators of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine to obtain a patent.239 
B. Recommendations to Resolve the Conflict Between Patents and 
Public Health 
The PTO’s conferral of a patent for a vaccine has sparked 
heated discussions between intellectual property scholars, public 
health agencies, and the government.  Much of the contested issues 
 
 232 Id. at 130. 
 233 See Zard, supra note 49, at 491. 
 234 See Gostin & Berkman, supra note 89, at 137. 
 235 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)(2) (2006).  See also WIPO, Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQs), supra note 48. 
 236 See Nicosia, supra note 8, at 491–92. 
 237 Arnoldo Lacayo, Seeking a Balance: International Pharmaceutical Patent 
Protection, Public Health Crises, and the Emerging Threat of Bio-Terrorism, 33 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 295, 304 (2002) (explaining that “stric[t] enforce[ment of] 
pharmaceutical patents enables drug companies in the developed world to charge 
exorbitant prices that the poor cannot afford”). 
 238 See generally Nicosia, supra note 8, at 491–94. 
 239 See, e.g., Anna Bishop, Editorial, Let’s Get the H1N1 Vaccine to All, GUELPH 
MERCURY, Oct. 13, 2009, at A2. 
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relate to the morality of patenting a vaccine.240  Whether a vaccine 
is perceived as a pharmaceutical or as a biotechnological 
innovation, the crux of the argument is similar.  On the one hand, 
proponents of the patent would like to reward the pharmaceutical 
company for creating the vaccine.241  On the other hand, those who 
oppose the patent are concerned with advancing the public good,242 
which in this case, involves protecting the public health by making 
the vaccine widely accessible.243  A patented vaccine is generally 
more costly.244  Hence, not all segments of the population would 
be able to afford a patented vaccine.245 
Although it is unclear whether the United States government 
evaluated this issue in these terms, it is apparent that the Obama 
administration recognized the severity of the viral 2009 H1N1 
swine flu pandemic.246  The Obama administration was also 
cognizant of the public health requirement that the 2009 H1N1 
vaccine be made available to all members of the population.247  
Thus, the federal government devised a solution wherein it 
purchased 250 million 2009 H1N1 vaccines directly from the 
pharmaceutical companies that invested time and resources in 
creating the 2009 H1N1 vaccine.248  This mass purchase of 
vaccines served to compensate the pharmaceutical companies for 
their inventions, while simultaneously permitting the 
 
 240 Recall that a vaccine can be classified either as a pharmaceutical or as a 
biotechnological creation. See supra text accompanying note 59.  Both of these 
classifications contain inherent morality issues. The two debates were presented in Part I 
of this Note, which describes the views of proponents and opponents of vaccine patents 
when vaccines are characterized either as pharmaceuticals or as biotechnological 
innovations. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 241 See Santoro, supra note 62, at 928–29; see also MILLS, supra note 81, at 10.  
Similarly, the Patent Act itself recognizes the need to reward the inventor by providing 
the pharmaceutical company with the right of exclusivity. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). 
 242 MILLS, supra note 81, at 12. 
 243 See Lacayo, supra note 237, at 304; see also Nicosia, supra note 8, at 491–94. 
 244 Lacayo, supra note 237, at 304. 
 245 Id. 
 246 See McNeil, Obama Warns of Return of Swine Flu in the Fall, supra note 169. 
 247 See id.  The Obama administration authorized the stockpiling of medicines and 
treatments designed to combat the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus. Editorial, Preparing for 
the Swine Flu, supra note 169.   
 248 David Brown, Experts Say H1N1 Outrunning Vaccine, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2009, 
at A4. 
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pharmaceutical companies to maintain their right of exclusivity.249  
The federal government concurrently addressed the public health 
concerns by providing the vaccines it purchased to health care 
providers, and ultimately to the general public, free of charge.250  
This part of the federal government’s solution resolves the issue of 
equal dissemination of an expensive vaccine to various 
communities regardless of their socioeconomic status and ability to 
afford the cost of the vaccine.  Specifically, public medical clinics 
were neither permitted to charge patients for the cost of the vaccine 
nor for its administration.251  Furthermore, private health care 
practitioners were only permitted to collect a co-payment for the 
administration of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine to their insured 
patients.252  Private health care providers who were the recipients 
of federal funding were not permitted to charge the uninsured for 
the administration of the vaccine.253  Thus, the government’s plan 
addressed the difficulty of accessing medical care in the absence of 
insurance coverage,254 which is another public health concern. 
However, it is necessary to evaluate the federal government’s 
plan from a financial perspective.  Although the 2009 H1N1 
vaccine was made available at no charge to the patient at the time 
that it was administered, in fact there are hidden costs associated 
with the vaccine.  Rather than actually providing a free vaccine, 
the federal government redistributed the money in its possession.  
In order to pay for the 2009 H1N1 vaccine, taxes will likely need 
to be raised in the future, thereby resulting in indirect payment for 
the 2009 H1N1 vaccine by taxpaying members of the general 
 
 249 This decision conforms nicely with the principles of the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 
154(a)(1) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee . . .  of the right to 
exclude others from making . . . the invention throughout the United States.”). 
 250 See H1N1 Update on Answers to Physician Questions, supra note 98, at 12–13.   
 251 Flu.gov, Vaccine Cost, supra note 217. 
 252 See id.  Even private health care providers are unable to charge their insured patients 
for the cost of the vaccine itself because the practitioners did not purchase the 2009 
H1N1 vaccine. Id.; see H1N1 Update on Answers to Physician Questions, supra note 98, 
at 12.  Rather, the government provided the practitioners with the vaccine at no cost so 
that it could subsequently be provided to their patients free of charge. See H1N1 Update 
on Answers to Physician Questions, supra note 98, at 12–13.   
 253 See Flu.gov, Vaccine Cost, supra note 217. 
 254 See id. 
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public.255  It is also likely that some of the federal funds that were 
redistributed in order to fund the 2009 H1N1 vaccine initiative 
were originally intended to fund other federal government projects 
that may indirectly be negatively impacted as a result. 
The Treasury established a Public Health Emergency Fund that 
is made available to the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (“HHS”)256 “without fiscal year limitation . . . 
only if a public health emergency has been declared by the 
Secretary.”257  Following the outbreak of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu 
pandemic and the April 2009 declaration of a public health 
emergency by Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the HHS,258 
Congress appropriated more money into the Public Health and 
Social Services Emergency Fund.259  Congress set aside $1.85 
billion “to prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic, 
including the development and purchase of vaccines, antivirals, 
necessary medical supplies, diagnostics, and other surveillance 
tools . . . relating to the 2009-H1N1 influenza outbreak.”260  This 
Act provides the Secretary of the HHS with three possible 
alternatives when responding to the 2009 H1N1 swine flu 
pandemic: (1) depositing the 2009 H1N1 vaccines, antivirals, and 
other medical supplies purchased in order to combat the 2009 
H1N1 swine flu pandemic into the Strategic National Stockpile; 
(2) constructing privately owned laboratories that could assist in 
 
 255 Posting of Bonnie Erbe to U.S. News & World Report Opinion, Obama’s Response 
to H1N1 Vaccine Crisis Could Be Key to Healthcare Reform, http://www.usnews.com 
/blogs/erbe/2009/10/29/-obamas-response-to-h1n1-vaccine-crisis-could-be-key-to-
healthcare-reform.html (Oct. 29, 2009, 16:32 EST) (discussing how government run 
healthcare programs historically harm the middle-class taxpayers). 
 256 One role of the Secretary of the HHS includes the task of “oversee[ing] advanced 
research, development, and procurement of qualified countermeasures . . . and qualified 
pandemic and epidemic products.” 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-10(b)(3) (2006). 
 257 Id. § 247d. 
 258 Jackie Calmes & Donald J. McNeil, Jr., Obama Declares the Swine Flu an 
Emergency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2009, at A1. 
 259 See Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 1859, 1884–86 
(2009).   
 260 Id. at 1884.  Of the additional funding worth $1.85 billion, Congress required that a 
minimum of $350 million must be allocated to improving the states’ responses to the 
2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic and that a minimum of $200 million be provided to the 
CDC for both laboratory research and surveillance of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu. Id. at 
1884–85. 
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the production of an adequate supply of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu 
vaccine and other necessary biologics; and (3) combining this 
funding (with the exception of funds that must be allocated to both 
state preparedness and to the CDC) with other funding that is 
available to the HHS and other federal agencies.261 
In addition to the funds made available to the Secretary of the 
HHS, another $5.8 billion of funding is controlled directly by the 
President.262  These additional funds can be appropriated “as 
emergency funds required to address critical needs related to 
emerging influenza viruses.”263  The President may also allow this 
additional emergency fund to be used for the purchase of vaccines 
and other biologics for the Strategic National Stockpile.264  In 
addition, after consultation with the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, these funds can be merged with other 
federal accounts held by either the HHS or other federal agencies 
for use at their discretion in the event of a public health crisis.265 
Although the government attempted to ensure equal 
distribution of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine and initially succeeded in 
this public health goal, the current scarcity of the vaccine will 
likely disturb the government’s allocation initiatives.266  A limited 
supply of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine will ultimately lead to unequal 
distribution in some manner because everyone who would like to 
access the vaccine will be unable to do so.  The waning supply 
could also result in socioeconomic stratification or in other 
rationing strategies based on the patient’s age, geographic location, 
exposure to other individuals who are afflicted with the 2009 
H1N1 swine flu virus, or based on a first-come-first-served 
method.267  In addition, there is a scarcity of the 2009 seasonal flu 
vaccine.268  The scarcity of both the 2009 H1N1 vaccine and the 
 
 261 See id. at 1884–86. 
 262 Id. at 1885. 
 263 Id.   
 264 Id.   
 265 Id. 
 266 See Editorial, Take the Shot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009, at A34, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/opinion/05thu3.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=vaccine%20
scarcity&st=cse. 
 267 See generally Gostin & Berkman, supra note 89, at 137–40. 
 268 McNeil, Nation Is Facing Vaccine Shortage for Seasonal Flu, supra note 219. 
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2009 seasonal flu vaccine likely resulted because the resources of 
the same pharmaceutical companies became overtaxed when the 
pharmaceutical companies produced both of the influenza vaccines 
during the 2009 flu season.269  “Federal officials and independent 
flu experts have said that the situation was unavoidable, given that 
the global swine flu pandemic has raised demand for all flu shots 
far beyond what manufacturers can make in a year.”270 
This scarcity of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine provides even more 
importance to the CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices (“ACIP”) that establishes a priority list of those 
individuals who should receive the vaccine.271  This list includes 
pregnant women, healthcare providers, all individuals between six 
months and twenty-four years of age, caregivers of children under 
six months of age, and people between the ages of twenty-five and 
sixty-four years old who are suffering from other health 
complications.272  ACIP’s prioritization is based upon its 
evaluation of “current disease patterns, populations most at risk for 
severe illness based on current trends in illness, hospitalizations 
and deaths, how much vaccine is expected to be available, and the 
timing of vaccine availability.”273  This prioritization list will 
further ensure that the 2009 H1N1 vaccine is offered widely to all 
individuals regardless of their socioeconomic class.  Thus, 
individuals who are listed on ACIP’s list will receive vaccination 
priority and socioeconomic stratification will be avoided.  
Although this prioritization does benefit some individuals before 
others, this order of patients requiring priority vaccination was 
established after analyzing medical needs and thus should not be 
considered an immoral form of unequal distribution. 
Furthermore, in order to avoid socioeconomic stratification, the 
government must ensure that these 250 million vaccines are 
available to all segments of the population, to both private 
 
 269 See generally FDA, Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccines Composition 
and Lot Release, supra note 3. 
 270 McNeil, Nation Is Facing Vaccine Shortage for Seasonal Flu, supra note 219. 
 271 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009 H1N1 Vaccination 
Recommendations, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/acip.htm (last visited Feb. 
21, 2010). 
 272 See id. 
 273 Id. 
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physicians and to public medical clinics.  This equality can be 
established by evaluating which physicians and medical personnel 
are obtaining the 2009 H1N1 vaccines that the government 
procured.  Similarly, it is also important to consider which projects 
may be negatively impacted as they will not benefit from the 
federal funds that were redistributed by the federal government to 
purchase the 2009 H1N1 vaccine and the sum that was made 
available in the Public Health Emergency Fund.274  It is necessary 
to ensure that the redistributed funding does not negatively impact 
the funding of other programs for the indigent in order to provide 
the 2009 H1N1 vaccine at no cost to both the underprivileged 
population as well as to members of the wealthier population.  
Monitoring these variables will ensure that these vaccines are 
being equally distributed to members of all socioeconomic classes. 
The resolution that the government adopted is sensible because 
it adequately recognizes the need to compensate pharmaceutical 
manufacturers while simultaneously providing the 2009 H1N1 
vaccine to the public at no charge.  However, it would be 
preferable that the plan be amended to include a safety net when a 
vaccine scarcity is encountered during a pandemic. This proposal 
would encourage the government to set up additional laboratory 
facilities that would be able to assist the private pharmaceutical 
companies in producing a sufficient supply of vaccines that may 
become necessary to counteract the pandemic.275  In this scenario, 
private pharmaceutical companies would produce the vaccines to 
their maximum capacity while simultaneously allowing the 
government laboratories to produce the balance of the vaccines 
that are required.  The pharmaceutical companies’ patents would 
still be in effect, but government laboratories would assist in the 
production of the balance of vaccines needed, thus sharing in the 
exclusivity rights in a manner reminiscent of a licensing 
 
 274 See supra notes 259–60 and accompanying text. 
 275 In fact, a similar notion was contemplated by Congress that states, “funds may be 
used for the construction or renovation of privately owned facilities for the production of 
pandemic influenza vaccine and other biologics, where the Secretary finds such a 
contract necessary to secure sufficient supplies of such vaccines or biologics.” 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 1859, 1885 (2009).   
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agreement.276  Therefore, the government would be limited to 
producing the drug in the short-term only when needed to meet 
urgent public health needs.  In addition, the federal government 
would provide the pharmaceutical companies with additional 
compensation for temporarily sharing their right of exclusivity. 
If this proposal had been adopted in time for the 2009 H1N1 
swine flu pandemic, the government could have assisted the 
private pharmaceutical companies in manufacturing the 2009 
H1N1 vaccine.  Thus the public could have benefited as it is much 
less likely that a scarcity of either the 2009 H1N1 vaccine or the 
2009 seasonal flu vaccine would have occurred.  Furthermore, the 
government could have continued to compensate the 2009 H1N1 
vaccine’s inventors and to provide this vaccine to all segments of 
the public while concurrently avoiding a vaccine shortage.  
Preventing a shortage of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine would have likely 
ensured its equal availability to all members of the population. 
Additional methods could be implemented to resolve the 
conflict that arises between the exclusive rights granted by patents 
and the urgent need for widespread availability of certain 
pharmaceutical or biotechnological products to the public in 
emergency situations.  In the past, when governments combated 
health crises, they did “not avoid the temptation to ignore patent 
rights when an underlying innovation [was] needed to respond to a 
crisis such as a health related epidemic.”277  For example, Congress 
and President George W. Bush’s administration were faced with a 
conflict between a public health emergency and patent law when 
an anthrax terrorist attack was anticipated in 2001.278  This conflict 
resulted because Bayer Pharmaceuticals had been granted a patent 
 
 276 See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (“The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal 
representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his 
application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United 
States.”). 
 277 Dennis D. Crouch, Nil: The Value of Patents in a Major Crisis Such as an Influenza 
Pandemic, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2009), available at http://law.shu.edu/ 
Students/academics/journals/law-review/Issues/archives/upload/Crouch.pdf.  However, 
when determining the resulting infringement cases, courts must evaluate the impact of the 
infringement upon the public before an injunction is imposed. eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 278 See Crouch, supra note 277, at 1128.   
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for Cipro, an antibiotic drug that cures anthrax.279  Although the 
government threatened to break the Cipro patent in order to 
stockpile the drug, it was able to reach an agreement with Bayer 
Pharmaceuticals wherein Cipro would be made available at a 
reduced price, and thus, would be widely accessible to the public 
in case of a widespread anthrax attack.280 
In the event that inevitable conflicts arise between patent law 
and public health needs, the government can decide to break a 
patent.  “A ‘broken’ patent might be defined as a patent whose 
rights are willfully ignored without recourse.”281  However, instead 
of intentionally breaking a patent and purposefully ignoring the 
rights of patent exclusivity, the government can choose to bend a 
patent by partially breaking it or merely threatening to break the 
patent.282  “The bottom line here is that—in an emergent crisis—
government entities will likely have both the legal right and 
political mandate to bend if not break patent rights over 
innovations deemed important in resolving the crisis.”283  Yet, if 
governments were to regularly implement this approach and to 
disregard patents, a disincentive for pharmaceutical companies to 
create drugs and vaccines that may be used when responding to 
public health crises may ensue.  Instead, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers may choose to focus their resources on developing 
biologics for illnesses that are not infectious diseases or public 
health threats.284  Thus, a compromise wherein compensation 
would be made to the patentees by the government in the event that 
a patent must be bent or broken would benefit the public health 
initiative in the long run. 
 
 279 See id.  Cipro is a pharmaceutical product; it is not a vaccine. U.S. Patent No. 
4,670,444 (filed May 29, 1984) (issued June 2, 1987). 
 280 See Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Cipro: A Reevaluation of 
Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 127 
(2002). 
 281 Crouch, supra note 277, at 1129. 
 282 See id. at 1129–30 
 283 Id. at 1132. 
 284 See id. at 1133–34 (“If the law offers weaker rights, a potential innovator will 
presumably feel marginally less inclined to pursue the innovation.  Following that 
premise, we expect that the reduced strength of patent rights during a public health crisis 
would likely reduce the incentive to innovate targeted solutions.”).  
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Public health goals are also threatened by various other 
potential costs relating to vaccine production such as the costs 
associated with the defense of future litigation, for example.  
Capping such ancillary costs that pharmaceutical producers of 
drugs or vaccines may potentially incur would bolster public health 
goals further.  Congress can accomplish this goal by extending the 
safeguards against future litigation in a manner similar to the 
Swine Flu Act of 1976.285  The notion of indemnifying the 
pharmaceutical companies and transferring the risk of litigation to 
the government exclusively in a manner similar to the Swine Flu 
Act of 1976286 would encourage future research and development 
of novel pharmaceutical or biotechnological innovations.  
However, this indemnification would entail inherent risks for the 
government in the instances where drugs and vaccines are 
determined to be unsafe.  In fact, Guillain-Barré syndrome, a 
potential risk associated with this indemnification materialized in 
response to the 1976 swine flu vaccine.287  If needed, the President 
could allocate some of the government’s emergency funds for use 
in defending or financing settlements for potential lawsuits should 
they occur.  Although this suggestion may include drawbacks for 
the government, it likely would further incentivize pharmaceutical 
companies to create drugs and vaccines.  Moreover, this policy 
would contribute to the public good while simultaneously 
minimizing the financial risks that manufacturers of novel vaccines 
and other anti-infective products may need to incur. 
III. CONFLICT BETWEEN PATENT TERMS AND DISEASE DURATION 
This section analyzes the timing issues that exist between a 
patent term and the length of time that a flu vaccine is considered 
effective.  Part III.A asks whether patents are the most effective 
approach to provide incentives for the pharmaceutical companies 
producing the 2009 H1N1 vaccine while ensuring the public good.  
The conflict between the relatively short duration of the 2009 
H1N1 vaccine’s medical utility versus the twenty-year term of 
 
 285 See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text.  
 286 See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 287 See supra notes 20309 and accompanying text. 
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exclusivity that is conferred when a patent is issued for this 
vaccine is discussed.  Part III.B provides recommendations to 
resolve this conflict.  It proposes that, rather than focusing on the 
short utility of the flu vaccine itself, patentees recognize that 
vaccines and other biotechnological innovations benefit the public 
good beyond the initial disease duration.  The usefulness of the 
scientific process utilized in creating the vaccine that is introduced 
by the inventor greatly outlasts the relatively short time frame 
wherein the actual vaccine is used to combat a seasonal disease. 
A. Conflict Between Influenza Timing and the Patent Term—Is 
Patent the Right Approach? 
Intellectual property law grants patents for a period of twenty 
years.288  During the patent term, the patent holder possesses an 
exclusive right over the patented creation.289  This exclusivity 
allows the patentee “to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States or importing the invention into the United States”290 for the 
term of the patent. 
The Patent Act states that a patent term extends for a period of 
twenty years.291  However, in actuality, the patentees do not hold 
an exclusive right to the invention for the full twenty years 
described in the statute.  In fact, although the twenty-year patent 
term begins to toll from the date a patent application is filed,292 the 
patentees are unable to enforce their exclusivity right until the date 
 
 288 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).   
 289 Id. § 154(a)(1). 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. § 154(a)(2) (describing a “term beginning on the date on which the patent issues 
and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the 
United States”). 
 292 Id.; see Osenga, supra note 41, at 127 (discussing problems associated with slow 
issuance); see also Cynthia M. Ho, Inoculation Inventions: The Interplay of Infringement 
and Immunity in the Development of Biodefense Vaccines, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 
111, 123 (2005) (“Since no patent rights exist while the application is pending, the 
effective term of a patent is twenty years minus the time the PTO takes to examine the 
application.  Although the examination period varies for different types of inventions, the 
average time is slightly over two years, thus making the average patent term around 
seventeen to eighteen years, although it may be considerably shorter if the examination 
time is lengthy.”). 
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that the patent is granted.293  “Thus, the period between the date an 
application is filed and the date the patent ultimately issues is 
essentially a dead period for the patentee . . . .”294  Regardless of 
the length of time it takes the PTO to grant a patent, it will 
certainly be issued at a later date than when the patent was filed 
and thus could not possibly provide the patentee with a full twenty 
years to enjoy the rights of exclusivity. 
Vaccine production, including the manufacturing process of the 
2009 H1N1 vaccine,295 is even more complex than the production 
method for other pharmaceuticals.296  Unlike other biologics, 
vaccines “are hard to make”297 because they must contain the 
relevant strain of the specific virus that the vaccine aims to 
prevent, whereas drugs and other pharmaceuticals that combat 
disease symptoms lack this complexity since they are not specific 
to certain viral strains.298  However, typically vaccines are 
lucrative innovations.299  Specifically, the Patent Act rewards 
vaccine creators by allowing them to both reap financial rewards 
and to exclusively manufacture their invention for the patent 
term.300  Yet, the flu vaccine does not share this lucrative 
characteristic with other vaccines.301  Flu vaccine “[p]rofits are 
lower and [an] unused flu vaccine expires after a few months.”302  
Furthermore, in contrast to other vaccines, such as the MMR 
vaccine which does not change in effectiveness from year to 
 
 293 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); Osenga, supra note 41, at 127. 
 294 Osenga, supra note 41, at 127–28. 
 295 See, e.g., CDC, Key Facts About 2009 H1N1 Flu Vaccine, supra note 3. 
 296 See supra Part I.B.2 (summarizing the characteristics unique to vaccines); see also 
McNeil, Nation Is Facing Vaccine Shortage for Seasonal Flu, supra note 219. 
 297 McNeil, Nation Is Facing Vaccine Shortage for Seasonal Flu, supra note 219. 
 298 See generally CDC, Seasonal Influenza, supra note 54. 
 299 McElligott, supra note 62, at 433 n.87. 
 300 See WIPO, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), supra note 48. 
 301 See McNeil, Nation Is Facing Vaccine Shortage for Seasonal Flu, supra note 219.   
 302 Id. 
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year,303 a flu vaccine is generally only profitable for one flu 
season, which lasts for only several months.304 
This notion of the limited duration of a flu vaccine’s relevance 
is especially applicable in the case of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine, 
which is only expected to be clinically effective for the 2009 flu 
season.305  Therefore, the swine flu vaccine creator may not need a 
twenty-year patent.  Perhaps another method of acknowledging 
and rewarding the creator of a flu vaccine would be both more 
desirable and more efficient. 
B. Recommendations to Resolve the Conflict Between Disease 
Duration and the Patent Term 
This section provides two recommendations to resolve the 
conflict between the short duration of a flu season, which is 
associated with the short-term use of the vaccine, and the twenty-
year patent term.  Part III.B.1 proposes an eighteen-hour expedited 
patent application review and a shortened patent term during 
public health emergencies.  The patent application should be 
evaluated before the rest of the queue.  Part III.B.2 resolves the 
conflict by underscoring the usefulness of the patented vaccine 
creation process for the twenty-year patent term despite the short-
term use of the vaccine itself. 
1. Recommendation: Shortened Patent Term and Expedited 
Review Process 
Given the fact that the patent term begins to toll on the date 
that the patent application is filed and before the patent is issued, 
creators of pharmaceuticals and other biologics would be unable to 
benefit from the full twenty-year patent term.306  This issue is 
compounded when flu vaccine patents are considered because the 
 
 303 See generally Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Measles, Mumps, and 
Rubella (MMR) Vaccine, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/Vaccines/MMR/MMR.html 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2010).  The MMR vaccine is a single vaccine that protects against 
three diseases: measles, mumps, and rubella. Id. 
 304 See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also CDC, The Flu Season, supra 
note 55. 
 305 See generally H1N1 Update on Answers to Physician Questions, supra note 98, at 
10. 
 306 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
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seasonal flu vaccine is only effective for one flu season.307  
Although the 2009 H1N1 swine flu differs from the seasonal flu308 
and thus it could potentially remain viable for longer than one flu 
season, the 2009 H1N1 swine flu is a virus that already has begun 
to mutate.309  Any change to the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus could 
render the 2009 H1N1 vaccine ineffective.  In fact, it is ironic that 
in some cases, the influenza season for which the vaccine was 
created may conclude before the patent is issued by the PTO.310  
Therefore, it seems that the pharmaceutical companies that created 
the 2009 H1N1 vaccine would only benefit from an expedited 
patent application review and would require a shortened 
exclusivity period. 
This quickly changing technology can be analogized to the 
rapidly evolving computer and software technologies.311  This is an 
apt analogy because “an entire generation of programs can cycle 
within a matter of months, in the continuous process of software 
development.”312  Similarly, the effectiveness of the flu vaccine 
also only lasts for a few months during the flu season.313  
Shortened patent terms have been suggested in response to these 
quickly evolving software programs.314  An abbreviated patent 
term would likely only be chosen when the “subject matter of the 
 
 307 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 308 See CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu, supra note 10. 
 309 See, e.g., World Health Organization, Public Health Significance of Virus Mutation 
Detected in Norway (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes 
/briefing_20091120/en/. 
 310 A seasonal flu vaccine is only effective for one flu season, which spans several 
months. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also CDC, The Flu Season, supra 
note 55.  The patent application for the seasonal flu vaccine will begin to toll when the 
patent is filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).  However, the patent prosecution period is 
generally two to three years. See generally Ho, supra note 292, at 123; Lemley, supra 
note 21, at 1500.  Thus, although the flu vaccine will hold a patent for a twenty-year 
term, the utility of the vaccine will only exist for several months, which will likely 
coincide with the patent prosecution period. 
 311 See generally Osenga, supra note 41; Kirk D. Rowe, Note, Why Pay for What’s 
Free?: Minimizing the Patent Threat to Free and Open Source Software, 7 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 595 (2008). 
 312 Rowe, supra note 311, at 617. 
 313 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 314 Osenga, supra note 41, at 149 (proposing a six-year patent term); Rowe, supra note 
311, at 617 (suggesting a seven-year patent term for software).  
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patent is in a high-tech field with a short life cycle.”315  In order to 
ensure the invention’s utility in light of the shortened patent term, 
proposals for abbreviated patents also contain a guarantee that the 
patents will be granted within one year of the filing date of the 
patent application.316  However, even a one-year patent application 
evaluation period could render a flu vaccine patent useless because 
the vaccine would be unlikely to provide an effective medical 
treatment one year after its creation (a new influenza virus will 
emerge and a new vaccine will have to be developed).  
Furthermore, during the evaluation period itself, the creator lacks 
the right of exclusivity that a patent confers.  Yet, it should be 
noted that “the total average time the [patent] examiner spends 
on . . . the two- to three- year prosecution of the patent is eighteen 
hours.”317  Therefore, the PTO could technically issue a patent, if it 
intends to grant one at all, within eighteen hours after receiving the 
patent application.  Thus, in public health emergency situations, 
such as the 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic, the PTO should issue 
a patent within eighteen hours of receiving the patent application.  
This form of expedited PTO approval would place public health 
patents that are associated with curtailing emergency public health 
situations at the beginning of the queue inspected by the patent 
examiners. 
Moreover, rather than applying for patent protection, the 
creators of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine could be provided with non-
patent incentives to produce the vaccine.  For example, rather than 
motivate the pharmaceutical companies to produce the 2009 H1N1 
vaccine so that they could obtain a patent and simultaneously 
obtain the right to exclusivity,318 the government could have 
provided the pharmaceutical companies with a payment advance to 
encourage research and development of flu vaccines.  However, 
the government would be unable to predict which pharmaceutical 
companies will ultimately succeed in creating the necessary flu 
vaccine.  Thus, in order to provide the pharmaceutical companies 
 
 315 Osenga, supra note 41, at 148. 
 316 See id. 
 317 Lemley, supra note 21, at 1500. 
 318 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006); WIPO, Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQs), supra note 48. 
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with an additional incentive to develop the 2009 H1N1 vaccine in 
lieu of patents, the federal government could have created a 
contract with the pharmaceutical companies which could have 
included bonus clauses to reward the successful and timely 
production of the flu vaccine.  The exact sum of the bonuses to be 
provided could be adjusted based on the severity and complexity of 
the disease and the virus strains involved. 
2. Recommendation: Patenting the Vaccine Creation Process 
Upon further analysis, it is possible that pharmaceutical 
companies could in fact benefit from patenting the 2009 H1N1 
vaccine for the full twenty-year term.  Although the patented 
innovation would probably not provide any medical benefit for the 
duration of the twenty-year patent term for the specific influenza 
virus it was intended to combat, the scientific process disclosed in 
the patent could prove beneficial to other scientists for a period of 
time lasting even longer than the twenty-year patent term.319  
Future scientific creations could be based upon past discoveries by 
employing the process disclosed in previous patents.320  In fact, 
this situation occurred when pharmaceutical companies created the 
2009 H1N1 vaccine.  This vaccine built on the knowledge and the 
scientific process utilized by the creators of the 2009 seasonal flu 
vaccine.321  The 2009 H1N1 vaccine consists of “a strain change to 
each manufacturer’s seasonal influenza vaccine.”322 
Another example involves adjuvants, which can increase an 
immune cell’s recognition of an antigen and can be used in the 
production of vaccines.323  The “development of adjuvants in the 
1980s and 1990s are bearing fruit now.”324  Specifically, adjuvants 
are used in the 2009 H1N1 vaccine produced by Novartis Vaccines 
and Diagnostics Ltd. that it submitted for patent.325  This 
 
 319 See FDA, Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccines Composition and Lot 
Release, supra note 3. 
 320 See id. 
 321 Id. 
 322 Id. 
 323 Nathalie Garcon & Michel Goldman, Boosting Vaccine Power, 301 SCI. AM. 72, 78 
(2009). 
 324 Id. 
 325 See, e.g., U.S. Patent Application No. 20090047353 (filed Nov. 6, 2006). 
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application of previously researched scientific technology is 
extremely beneficial since fewer antigens are required for 
immunization, which leads to a speedier vaccine production time 
frame.326  By adding adjuvants to the vaccine, both the seasonal flu 
vaccine and the H5N1 avian flu, for example, “elicited protective 
antibody responses using just a third the amount of antigen in a 
typical flu season vaccine.”327 
“Pandemic influenza requires large populations to be 
vaccinated.  Adjuvants can make vaccines effective with less 
antigen per dose and possibly protective against flu strains that 
vary slightly from the original.”328  Thus, it is likely that the 2009 
patent application submitted by Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics 
Ltd. builds upon scientific processes discovered previously that 
greatly benefit public health goals.  In fact, the National Institutes 
of Health (“NIH”) is currently sponsoring additional research 
leading to vaccine adjuvant discovery.329  “Adjuvants can be used 
not only to enhance the immune response to a vaccine and thereby 
offer better protection, but also to extend the vaccine supply if 
needed, enabling more people to be vaccinated with fewer 
doses.”330 
This type of novel vaccine technology is not limited in its 
application to a seasonal influenza or to a unique pandemic.  
Rather, its scientific ramifications are long-lasting.  The patent 
holder of adjuvant technology discoveries will most certainly 
benefit over the twenty-year patent term because the process of 
adding adjuvants can be patented in addition to patenting the 
vaccine produced.  While the vaccine patent may only provide the 
patentee with exclusive benefits for a short time period limited to 
the duration of a flu season, the creation process employed when 
inventing a flu vaccine will exhibit utility even after the 
culmination of a particular flu season.  Thus, the patentee would 
 
 326 Garcon & Goldman, supra note 323, at 78. 
 327 Id. 
 328 Id. 
 329 Press Release, Nat’l Insts. of Health, NIAID Announces Vaccine Adjuvant 
Discovery Contracts (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/oct2009/niaid-
08.htm. 
 330 Id. 
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benefit from the twenty-year patent term if the process, as well as 
the product, is patented. 
Additional proof that flu vaccine patents can still provide 
scientific benefit even when they are no longer medically useful 
can be gleaned from the patents that were granted in relation to the 
1976 H1N1 vaccine.331  Although the patents granted for the 1976 
H1N1 vaccine lost their clinical significance when people who 
received the vaccination developed Guillain-Barré syndrome, a 
paralyzing neuromuscular disorder,332 these patents have 
maintained their scientific and research benefits and have both 
been cited in future patent applications as recently as a patent that 
was filed in 2006 and issued in 2008.333  The scientific process 
utilized in the creation of the 1976 H1N1 vaccine has outlasted the 
usefulness of both the vaccine itself and its twenty-year patent 
term.  This phenomenon illustrates the long term applicability of 
the creation process.  Hence, this analysis underscores the value of 
a twenty-year patent term that could prove beneficial to the 
creators of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine if they patent the creation 
process as well as the vaccine produced. 
The debate regarding the utility of a twenty-year patent term 
for the 2009 H1N1 vaccine must consider whether a vaccine is 
primarily a pharmaceutical (product) or a biotechnological 
(process) innovation.  If the 2009 H1N1 vaccine is viewed as a 
pharmaceutical and only the product itself is patented, then its 
benefits are solely medical and a twenty-year patent term would 
not provide the patentee with any benefits because the 
pharmaceutical companies would be unable to capitalize on their 
 
 331 See U.S. Patent No. 4,009,258 (filed Aug. 5, 1974) (issued Feb. 22, 1977); see also 
U.S. Patent No. 4,029,763 (filed Jan. 16, 1975) (issued June 14, 1977). 
 332 FAUCI ET AL., supra note 59, at 2462; Appel, supra note 189, at 71.  
 333 U.S. Patent No. 7,468,187 (filed Oct. 5, 2006) (issued Dec. 23, 2008).  Another 
eleven patent applications cite to U.S. Patent No. 4,029,763 and a total of sixteen patent 
applications cite to U.S. Patent No. 4,009,258. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Results 
of Search in U.S. Patent Collection db for REF/4029763, http://patft.uspto.gov/netacg 
i/nphParser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2Fsearch-adv.htm 
&r=0&f=S&l=50&d=PALL&Query=ref/4029763 (last visited Nov. 20, 2009); U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, Results of Search in U.S. Patent Collection db for 
REF/4009258, http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nphParser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF& 
p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2Fsearchadv.htm&r=0&f=S&l=50&d=PALL&Query=ref/40092
58 (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). 
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right of exclusivity for the majority of the patent term.334  
However, if the 2009 H1N1 vaccine is perceived to be a 
biotechnological innovation and the creation process is patented, 
then the scientific process involved in creating the vaccine and the 
information gleaned from the 2009 H1N1 vaccine patent would 
potentially allow the patentee to reap financial rewards for the full 
twenty-year patent term. 
Patents encourage innovation, thereby leading to 
pharmaceutical and biotechnological advances that will promote 
life and benefit the public.  Thus, the patent term of twenty years 
for a flu vaccine is logical if the creation process is patented.  The 
novel technology will be applicable to the creation of other 
vaccines and will generally promote the public good. 
CONCLUSION 
The 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic highlights the tension 
between the inherent purpose of patent law as set forth in the 
Patent Act and the goals of public health.  Patents seek to reward 
the pharmaceutical companies that invested time and resources to 
develop the 2009 H1N1 vaccine335 whereas public health goals 
strive to distribute the 2009 H1N1 vaccine widely throughout the 
population.336  In an effort to advance public health goals, the 
federal government purchased 250 million 2009 H1N1 vaccines 
and engaged in the widespread dissemination of the vaccine at no 
cost to the public, thereby increasing accessibility of the vaccine 
 
 334 Each year different strains of the flu virus develop.  Therefore, new vaccines will be 
produced to provide immunity against the new influenze strains.  A vaccine will expire 
after the flu season is over, usually within a year of its production, which signals the end 
of the profitability of this particular “pharmaceutical product.” See CDC, Shortened 
Expiration Period for Sanofi Pasteur 2009 H1N1 Vaccine in Pre-filled Syringes 
Questions & Answers (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/qa_ 
expiration.htm; see also N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, Notice of Expiration Date Change of 
Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccine 1 (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.health. 
state.ny.us/diseases/communicable/influenza/h1n1/health_care_providers/vaccine/docs/2
010-1-11_notice_of_expiration_date_change.pdf (listing expiration dates of three 
different H1N1 2009 Monovalent vaccines as of January 2010). 
 335 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 336 See supra Part I.B.1. 
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despite individuals’ socioeconomic statuses.337  However, the 
federal government could have assisted private pharmaceutical 
companies in the production of the vaccine for the length of the 
pandemic in a manner similar to a licensing agreement in order to 
avoid the shortages of both the 2009 H1N1 vaccine and the 2009 
seasonal flu vaccine.338 
Another discrepancy exists between the lengthy twenty-year 
patent term and the reality that an influenza vaccine provides a 
medical benefit for only several months.  However, this conflict 
only poses problems when considering the 2009 H1N1 vaccine 
from a purely clinical perspective.  Evaluating the 2009 H1N1 
vaccine as a biotechnological innovation—as a step forward in the 
progression of science—rather than as a strictly pharmaceutical 
advance, permits inventors to reveal valuable scientific creation 
processes that would remain applicable for a longer length of time 
than the 2009 H1N1 vaccine’s short period of clinical utility.339  A 
twenty-year patent term remains valuable to the pharmaceutical 
companies that created the 2009 H1N1 vaccine because they retain 
exclusive control over the novel discoveries presented in their 
research, which could serve as a template for future vaccine 
production.340 
 
 
 337 See supra Part I.C.4. 
 338 See supra Part II.B. 
 339 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 340 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 
